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Abstract 
 
The Kyoto Protocol allows for the development of an international emissions-trading 
system. This led to the formulation of various mechanisms, namely Joint 
Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emissions-
trading (ET).  
 
Given the potential emission-reduction targets in 2012 for developing countries, and 
in particular for South Africa, the objective of this study is identifying the current 
implementation of the CDM project cycle steps, as well as assessing the 
appropriateness of them. Constraints, bottlenecks and opportunities, are identified 
and suggestions for improvement are made, in order to improve the body of 
scientific knowledge. 
 
From the literature survey, and from discussions with experts in the field, it appears 
as if the benefits and issues identified, corroborate international findings. Benefits for 
countries hosting CDM projects include improved balance of payment, technology 
transfer and replacement of inefficient technology. Commonly occurring concerns, 
are that baseline setting, additionality and the entire CDM project cycle is complex. 
Resource and time constraints could jeopardize projects. Transaction costs have 
been prohibitive, further compounded by lack of initial upfront funding. Bureaucracy 
from the CDM executive board has frustrated attempts to implement projects. Lack 
of methodologies, as well as huge risk and cost in developing new methodologies 
have been obstacles for project developers, while clear guidelines on monitoring, 
governance and additionality have been conspicuously absent. Suggestions for 
improvement have been regular baseline revision and standard assessment 
procedures, application of the gold standard and an additionality tool. 
 
Issues that seem to be uniquely particular to South Africa are the slow adoption of 
large companies to accept the benefits of CDM, difficulty in convincing company 
executives to embark on CDM projects, as well as unwillingness to delegate 
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authority to technical staff. Another notable pattern is a mismatch of opinion between 
scientists, academics and business. South Africa uniquely, produces 90% of its 
energy from fossil fuels, which could limit the adoption of CDM.  
 
Lack of institutional knowledge and experience is concerning, as well as ethics and 
little collaboration amongst stakeholders. Innovative suggestions for improvement 
have included a weighting for sustainable development indicators, benchmarks to 
simplify baselines, sink projects to be excluded owing to their risk, sellers clearing 
houses, industrial gases to be excluded, and programmatic CDM. Another important 
suggestion is that taxation of CDM credits should be abandoned, and the restrictive 
Public Finance Management Act to be improved. The proposed study has attempted 
to highlight some of these significant issues, with the view to improving the current 
knowledge and advance the possibility of alleviating some of these burdening 
issues. 
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Regarding climate change, mankind stands accused of “conducting a gigantic 
scientific experiment with the planet, and the consequences could be disastrous” 
(Meyer, Hildyard, 1997, 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield 
 
Ulysses, by Alfred Lord Tennyson 
 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract.....................................................................................................................3 
Acknowledgements..................................................................................................5 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................8 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................9 
Abbreviations, Acronyms, Glossary.....................................................................10 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.........................................................................11 
1.1  South Africa as an investment destination...................................................12 
1.2  Recent Climate Decisions and Conferences.................................................17 
1.3  Problem Statement..........................................................................................20 
1.4  Justification and importance..........................................................................21 
1.5  Hypothesis.......................................................................................................22 
1.6  Aims and Objectives .......................................................................................22 
1.7  Study Area .......................................................................................................23 
1.8 - Methodology...................................................................................................23 
1.9  Conclusion.......................................................................................................24 
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW..............................................................26 
2.1  Introduction .....................................................................................................26 
2.2  The Kyoto Protocol and Market-based Mechanisms ...................................28 
2.3  The Marrakech Accords..................................................................................34 
2.4  Comparison of CDM and JI projects to International Emissions Trading..35 
2.5  Benefits, Barriers and possible solutions for CDM and JI projects............36 
2.5.1  Barriers to CDM projects in South Africa...................................................41 
2.6  Sustainable Development...............................................................................41 
2.7  CDM project cycle ...........................................................................................51 
2.8  Case studies of CDM projects in South Africa and Worldwide...................64 
2.9  Conclusions.....................................................................................................71 
CHAPTER THREE - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION...............................................74 
3.1 Conclusions......................................................................................................90 
CHAPTER FOUR - CONCLUSION..........................................................................92 
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................102 
 7 
Appendix 1- Interviewee Details .........................................................................108 
Appendix 2  Questionnaire for interviewees Carbon Trading and the Clean 
Development Mechanism in South Africa..........................................................109 
Appendix 3  Technological options for mitigation of carbon dioxide and Sink 
Projects .................................................................................................................110 
Appendix 4  Other Players in the Carbon Market ..............................................113 
Appendix 5  Carbon revenue for projects ..........................................................116 
Appendix 6  Market potential of CDM credits and typical transaction costs ..119 
Appendix 7  Small Scale projects and mechanisms of reducing costs ..........127 
Appendix 8  Buyers and Sellers of project-based credits ................................131 
Appendix 9  Enforcement Mechanisms for non compliant countries .............133 
Appendix 10  Institutions that have contributed to the development of CDM 134 
Appendix 11  Wits ethics committee application form and protocol...............141 
 
 8 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Key decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties 11 and COP/MOP1 
.................................................................................................................................18 
Table 2: Burden-sharing Agreement .......................................................................31 
Table 3: Barriers that could be addressed by CDM investment ..............................40 
Table 4: Examples of Sustainable Development Criteria identified by host countries 
.................................................................................................................................43 
Table 5 Projects that could attract CDM investments ..............................................48 
Table 6:  Interviewee perception of barriers, bottlenecks, benefits of the CDM project 
cycle and suggestions for improvements .................................................................74 
Table 7: CDM Transaction costs ...........................................................................122 
Table 8: CDM Transaction Cost Estimates ...........................................................123 
Table 9: Examples of impact of CERs on project IRR ...........................................126 
Table 10: The Executive Board’s current version of small-scale CDM project activity 
...............................................................................................................................127 
Table 11: Sectoral Scopes for which AEs and DOEs can be accredited ...............137 
 
 
 
 
 9 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Technology Share of Emission-reduction Projects ...................................47 
Figure 2: Market Buyers (Share of volume of emission-reductions purchased) ......49 
Figure 3: Location of Emission-reduction Projects (in share of volume supplied) ...50 
Figure 4: Graphical depiction of the CDM project cycle ...........................................51 
Figure 5: Activity scale showing the notional relationship between artificially high, 
true and conservative baselines,..............................................................................54 
Figure 6:  Key benefits from CDM projects ..............................................................80 
Figure 7: Key constraints for CDM projects .............................................................87 
Figure 8: Key Suggestions for improvement in.........................................................90 
Figure 9: Percentage of projects that fall under the definitions of small scale ........129 
 10 
Abbreviations, Acronyms, Glossary 
 
AA   Assigned Amounts 
AAU  Assigned amount units 
AIJ  Activities implemented jointly 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CER  Certified Emission-reduction 
COP  Conference of Parties 
DME  Department of Mineral Affairs and Energy   
DOE  Designated Operational Entity 
DNA  Designated National Authority 
EB  Executive Board (CDM)   
EDRC  Energy Development and Research Centre 
ERI  Energy Research Institute 
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment 
ERU  Emissions Reduction Unit 
ET  Emissions Trading 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRR  Internal Rate of Return 
JI  Joint Implementation 
MOP  Meeting of Parties 
NAP  National Allocation Plans 
NPV  Net present Value 
OE  Operational Entity 
PDD  Project Design Document 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
 11 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
The responsibilities of developing countries in mitigation of climate change are 
becoming increasingly significant, yet fraught with political controversy (Reid and 
Goldenberg, 1998). Their projected greenhouse gas emissions are expected to 
exceed those of developed countries, by 2020. Naturally, developed countries have 
requested that developing countries take considerably stronger action in order to 
prevent or at least alleviate these emissions.  
 
Fortunately many developing countries are limiting emissions through reduction of 
fossil fuel subsidies. China has made impressive savings over a ten year period by 
dropping coal subsidies from 37% in 1984 to 29% in 1995. India, Mexico, Saudi 
Arabia, Brazil and South Africa (all of whom rank in the top 25 industrial carbon 
dioxide emitters), have cut their fossil fuel subsidies considerably (Reid and 
Goldemberg, 1998). Other developing countries have advocated the use of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. In particular, Mexico, India and Brazil and South 
Africa have established specific energy efficiency and renewable energy programs 
(Reid and Goldemberg, 1998). 
 
Considering the enormous global effort required to mitigate climate change, and the 
significant effect of developing countries, it would be prudent to investigate the 
potential of emission-reduction projects in South Africa and the relevance of South 
Africa as an investment destination (Reid and Goldemberg, 1998).  
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1.1  South Africa as an investment destination 
 
Although the literature available refers to the attractiveness of a region/supplier to be 
dependent not only on low cost emission-reductions, but also on the business 
climate (for JI implementations), this could equally apply to CDM projects in South 
Africa and other developing countries. A compelling business environment has many 
dimensions, but would include quality of institutions, effective policies, legal and 
regulatory frameworks, political and economic stability, efficient and just tax system, 
as well as a free market society (Frankhauser and Lavric, 2003). Ethics and integrity 
of public and private participants and the minimizing of crime and corruption is also 
very important. Acceptable infrastructure and a thriving financial sector would be 
contributing factors (Franhauser and Lavric, 2003). 
 
South Africa is a developing country positioned at the most southern tip of Africa. It 
has a population of approximately 43 million people, with a land area of 1.2 million 
square kilometers (UNIDO, 2004). South Africa is very vulnerable, should emission-
reduction targets be imposed, since it is based on a fossil fuel economy, exports 
coal, and has not developed sufficient alternative technologies. In 1998, 90% of 
carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion originated from coal (Winkler et al., 
2002). South Africa produced approximately 194 TWh of electricity in 2000 (Sathaye 
et al., 2004). This was mostly from coal-fired power stations which are largely owned 
and operated by Eskom (a state owned enterprise). At the end of 2000 there were 
50 power stations operating, of which 20 were coal-fired. The non-coal power 
stations include Koeberg (Nuclear power station) and three pumped storage facilities 
(Sathaye et al., 2004). Eskom does have some mothballed stations (reserve stations 
owing to excess capacity), but they are mostly 30 years old. New potential projects 
revolve around importing gas from Kudu Gas Fields, an efficient steam coal plant, a 
wind farm in Darling, imported hydro electric power as well as recommissioning two 
units in mothballed power stations (Sathaye et al., 2004). 
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From an economic perspective, South Africa is the largest producer of gold and 
platinum group metals in the world, the fifth biggest producer of diamonds, and the 
forth largest producer of coal. Fossil fuels provide for 90% of the energy demand as 
mentioned above (UNIDO, 2004). South Africa would be well-placed to host Clean 
Development Mechanism projects owing to the strength of its economy and 
infrastructure and in particular, its extensive network of roads and rail, at least seven 
deep water ports and large amount of natural mineral resources. Further to that, it is 
the most technologically and economically advanced country in Africa (UNIDO, 
2004). South Africa’s emission intensity is quite high in relation to other developing 
countries and emitted 0.96kg carbon dioxide per dollar of GDP, while other non-
OECD countries emitted an average of  0.66 (UNIDO, 2004). Despite a small 
population, South Africa is one of the top 20 emitters of greenhouse gases, and this 
is attributed to its dependence on coal, production of synthetic liquid fuels from coal, 
large mining and industries heavily reliant on energy, as well as wastage of energy. 
From calculations done, it appears as if “South Africa consumes half of Africa’s 
electricity, with only 5% of its population” (UNIDO, 2004, 23). In 1990, South Africa 
emitted 1.02 % of total greenhouse gas emissions, (in 1994 it emitted 380 million 
tons of carbon dioxide - the per capita emissions of 8.5 tons which was double the 
global average of 4 tons (Kim, 2003), while in 1999 it had increased to 1.6% of 
global emissions. Inventories of emissions in 1994 showed that 78% of greenhouse 
gases originated from the energy sector, 9.3% from agriculture, 8% from industrial 
processes, and 4.3% from waste. Of all the greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide 
contributed 83.2%, methane 11.4% and nitrous oxide 5.4% (UNIDO, 2004).  
 
Many industry associations have been researching climate-change issues, in 
particular Sasol, Eskom, The Chamber of Mines and the Chemical and Allied 
Industry Association (CAIA). The chemical industry contributes 5.3 % of GDP and 
represents 23% of the manufacturing sector (Kim, 2003). Eskom is one of the largest 
national energy suppliers and dominates bulk electricity sales. It has been able to 
provide inexpensive electricity from the country’s plentiful coal supplies. 
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Carbon dioxide emissions are by far the greatest contributor to greenhouse gas 
emissions and the view is that they will continue to contribute the most for the 
foreseeable future; therefore they have been the main focus in all mitigation actions. 
Carbon dioxide emissions are produced almost entirely from fossil fuel use and are 
therefore relatively easy to measure and monitor. In addition, the electricity sector 
produces one third of total carbon dioxide emissions in the EU, the industrial sector 
produces one sixth and households, one fifth. It is expected that since the electricity 
sector is well informed of the potential to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and 
tightly regulated, they will produce many of the emissions-reductions projects 
(Svendsen, 2003). Globally, carbon dioxide emissions have increased by 10% from 
1990 to 1999. Growth in emissions from developing countries has been noticeable, 
despite the fact that per capita emissions are low (Dagoumas et al., 2006). 
Emissions growth is seen to be owing to changes in GDP, population and the carbon 
intensity of the output. Based on predictive models for the period 1990-2010 the 
GDP growth is estimated to be 2.3% per annum for developed countries, and 4.4 % 
per annum for developing countries. These models also predict that global 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide will be 64.2% for the period 1990-2010 
(Dagoumas et al., 2006). Emissions from developing countries are predicted to 
increase by between 1.2 % per annum (Dagoumas et al., , 2006) and 2.2% (Galeotti 
and Lanza, 1999), while developing countries  are predicted to increase their 
emissions by approximately 3.3% (Galeotti and Lanza, 1999). 
 
Other studies have shown that developed countries are characterized by high 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita and low carbon dioxide emissions per GDP, 
while developing countries exhibit low carbon dioxide emissions per capita and high 
carbon dioxide emissions per GDP. Asian countries, especially have high carbon 
dioxide emissions per GDP (Shin, 1998). Developing countries demonstrate a high 
population growth, low level of income, rapid economic development and very low 
GHG emissions and energy consumption per capita (Shin, 1998). 
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The Kyoto Protocol, signed at the third UNFCCC conference of the parties (COP3), 
established commitments and greenhouse gas emission-reduction targets for 
industrialized countries for the period 2008-2012 (Ellis and Treanton, 1998). 
Moreover, this agreement requires industrialized countries to consider ways to 
minimize adverse effects on developing countries (whose economies are dependent 
on export and consumption of fossil fuels), through mechanisms such as funding, 
insurance and transfer of technology (Babiker et al., 2000). For the Kyoto Protocol to 
be adopted, it required at least 55 parties to ratify it, covering at least 55% of the 
developed countries’ carbon dioxide emissions since 1990. In particular it needed 
approval from Russia or the USA. Fortunately, Russia did approve the protocol, but 
the USA felt that it contained provisions that could be harmful to the US economy. 
They also felt that developing countries should be subject to GHG emission-targets 
similar to those of developed countries (Shin, 1998). 
 
Eventually all countries (including developing ones), would need to reduce their 
emissions, in order to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas reductions (Winkler et 
al., 2002). Economic growth, population, and emissions (annual and historic) are 
factors which would affect allocation schemes based on emissions intensity (CO2/ 
GDP), carbon dioxide emissions per capita and ability to pay (GDP per capita). Top- 
down, rule-based allocation schemes or pledge-based allocation schemes are 
possible options. When considering an equity-based view for allocation schemes, 
developing countries would argue that they have an entitlement to emissions since 
they have not polluted the atmosphere as much as developed countries have. Six 
major developing countries were evaluated (South Africa, China, Brazil, India, 
Argentina and Nigeria), with widely differing results. Top down allocation schemes 
encompass allocation of global growth caps, distributing reductions, or lastly, a 
rights-based approach (equal emissions per capita). Pledge-based allocation 
schemes require each country to propose a target, and negotiate internationally 
(Winkler et al., 2002). 
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From the research done, (Winkler et al., 2002), it appears as if  South Africa is the 
only one of the six countries with emissions per capita above world average 
(Argentina is close to average). From an ability to pay perspective, South Africa and 
Argentina are above average, with Brazil, China and India below. South Africa and 
China’s emission-intensity is above world average. Primarily, the structure of each 
country’s energy economies would affect the allocation schemes mentioned before. 
South Africa and Argentina have a greater than average ability to pay, so would be 
allocated fewer allowances, while China, India and Nigeria would benefit as they are 
poorer. Under a per capita scheme, South Africa would also clearly not benefit as it 
has a smaller population than India, Nigeria or China and has a higher emissions per 
capita. Lastly, under an emissions-intensity scheme, South Africa would also not 
benefit. Since it becomes patently obvious that the same allocation scheme would 
have vastly different effects on each country, two approaches have been proposed: 
Either, grouping countries into different categories with appropriate targets, or 
calculating reduction in emission intensity rather then a cap on total emissions. 
These approaches still need to evolve, especially owing to the fact that it would be 
inequitable to allocate the same reductions across all countries even, if adjusted for 
ability to pay, emissions intensity or emissions per capita (Winkler et al., 2002). 
 
There is a growing viewpoint, that GHG emission targets could be set for companies 
or sectors through incentives and regulations, within South Africa and other 
developing countries. It is also possible that GHG mitigation could be required by 
law and so carbon trading could become an important practice for companies. As a 
consequence, companies could pre-emptively include costs of GHG mitigation in 
new projects, consider renewable energy and energy efficiency and develop new 
energy-efficient technologies. They could also set emission targets for themselves 
and monitor their performance against these targets, as well as construct carbon 
trading systems within their companies (Energy Research Institute, 2002). 
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1.2  Recent Climate Decisions and Conferences 
 
Quite recently, (28 November to 9 December 2005), Canada hosted the first meeting 
of the parties (MOP 1) to the Kyoto Protocol in Montreal, while simultaneously, the 
eleventh session of the conference of parties (COP 11) to the Climate Change 
Convention, was held. This was an historic event since it heralded the entry into 
force, of the Kyoto Protocol. More than forty decisions that will strengthen global 
efforts to fight climate change were adopted.  Speaking at the closing address in 
Montreal, the conference president, Canadian Environment Minister Stephane Dion 
said “Key decisions have been made in several areas. The Kyoto Protocol has been 
switched on, a dialogue about the future action has begun, parties have moved 
forward work on adaptation and advanced the implementation of the regular work 
program of the convention and the protocol” (UNFCCC, 2005) 
 
Some of the key decisions taken by COP11 and COP/MOP1 relating to CDM and 
emissions-trading are illustrated in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Key decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties 11 and 
COP/MOP1 (After unfcc.int/meetings/Cop_11, 2005) 
 
 COP 11 COP/MOP1 
1. Dialogue on long-term 
cooperative action to address 
climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the 
convention 
Consideration of commitments for 
subsequent periods for Annex 1 
parties to the convention under 
article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol 
2. Five year program on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change 
Further guidance  relating to the 
clean development mechanism 
(CDM) 
3. Submission of the second and 
where appropriate third national 
communications from non-
Annex 1 parties to the 
convention 
Guidance relating to CDM 
4. Tables of  common reporting 
format for LULUCF 
Modalities and procedures  for a 
CDM as defined in article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol 
5. Additional guidance to an 
operating entity of the financial 
mechanism 
Modalities and procedures  for 
afforestation and reforestation and 
reforestation activities under the 
CDM in the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol 
6. Development and transfer of 
technologies 
Simplified modalities and 
procedures for small scale 
afforestation project activities  under 
the CDM 
7. Review processes during the 
period  2006-2007 for Annex 1 
parties to the convention 
Procedures and mechanisms 
relating to compliance under the 
Kyoto Protocol 
8. Research needs relating to the 
convention 
Modalities for the accounting of the 
assigned amounts under Article 7.4 
of the Kyoto Protocol 
9. Institutional linkage of the  
secretariat to the United 
Nations 
 Guidance relating to the registry 
systems under Article 7 of the KP 
10. Program for the budget  for the 
biennium 2006-2007 
Capacity  building  relating to the 
implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in developing countries 
11. Budget Performance in the 
Biennium 2004-2005 as at 30 
June 2005 
Capacity  building  relating to the 
implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol in parties with economies 
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 COP 11 COP/MOP1 
in transition 
12.  Land use, land use change and 
forestry (LULUCF) 
13.  Good practice guidance for LULUCF 
activities  under Article 3, paragraph 
3 and 4 of the Kyoto Protocol 
14.  Program Budget for the Biennium 
2006-2007 
15.  Budget performance in the biennium 
2004-2005 as at 30 June  2005 
 
In addition, a statement made by Marthinus van Schalkwyk, Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, following the UNFCC COP11 and COP/MOP1 
corroborated the view that Africa was a significant and meaningful participant to the 
Kyoto Protocol.  He felt that it was time for “developing countries to take further 
action on their respective commitments under the convention, while recognizing the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, and that the developed 
countries to provide positive incentives to developing countries to do more” 
(Aucamp, 2005). He believed that the six objectives namely, of promoting African 
solidarity and a coordinated African position, adopting the 19 Marrakesh Accords, 
improving the Clean Development Mechanism, emphasizing adaptation to the 
adverse impacts of climate change, and open dialogue on long-term cooperation 
and enhanced implementation of the protocol could be achieved. 
 
South Africa has, in light of the above concerns, developed a national climate 
strategy, (launched on 7 October 2004 by the Deputy Minister of Environment Affairs 
and Tourism, Rejoice Mabudafhasi), which is based on a number of principles: 
(Kelly, 2004). First and foremost, it recognizes that climate change will have adverse 
impacts, and adaptation is necessary. Development is an ever-present requirement, 
as is growing the economy with the proviso that it remains competitive therefore, 
South Africa’s emissions will continue to increase. Sustainable social, economic and 
environmental development needs have to be promoted, while using locally 
available resources. In addition, poverty eradication and job creation will be 
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addressed. This integrated climate response strategy should ensure that climate 
issues are part of government policies and practices (Kelly, 2004).  
 
Other concerns for South Africa are that certain areas of the country will become 
hotter and drier, while other areas will become wetter. It is also possible that crop 
production may be affected, with the maize triangle at great risk of non-existence 
within the next two generations (Kelly, 2004). The strategy has in particular, 
prioritized the development of renewable energy in order to obtain 10000 Gigawatt 
hours per annum by 2012, from renewable sources. The mitigation strategy is based 
on the premise of implementing a white paper on renewable energy and energy 
efficiency.  Greenhouse Gas emissions in the agricultural sector need to be reduced, 
forest schemes should be extended and waste management needs to be optimized. 
Further to that, industrial development should be sustainable, while coal mining and 
the transport sector should follow relevant mitigation programs. Education, 
awareness and training programs should facilitate the appropriate response. 
Relevant ministries should ensure proper management programs are set in place, 
especially agricultural, rangeland and forestry practices, as well as countering health 
related impacts. The reaction to this initiative has generally been favorable. 
However, it has been said by some critics, that this strategy does not go far enough, 
but they do concede that it is a step in the right direction. A concrete action plan 
would be welcomed (Kelly, 2004). 
 
 
 1.3  Problem Statement 
 
South Africa is also in a unique position in that it is the fourth largest producer of 
coal,  produces 90% of its energy from fossil fuels, most of this inexpensively from 
coal (and has not developed sufficient alternative technologies), which could limit the 
adoption of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It is the most technologically 
advanced country in Africa, and is one of the top 20 emitters of greenhouse gases. 
This is most definitely attributed to its dependence on coal. Considering that 
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developing countries may be allocated emission-reduction targets in 2012, what are 
the barriers and constraints that South Africa may encounter when implementing 
CDM projects? There are also, however, a range of possible negatives including the 
fact that CDM projects may potentially become more expensive than JI projects (if 
the stipulation that 2% of the value of the Certified Emission-reduction credits should 
be set aside for adaptation and administration costs, is applied) (Michaelowa and 
Jotzo, 2005). Taxes on CDM projects could limit CDM supply resulting in some 
developing countries not embarking on CDM projects if the credit prices are very low 
(Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). Another concern would be if “Sustainable 
Development” is interpreted too strictly and increases the price of CDM projects (see 
more detail below). Other issues affecting the sale of CDM projects could involve 
transaction costs, and institutional rigidities (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005; Kim, 
2003; Tangen and Heggeland, 2003; OECD, 2004).  Transaction costs increase as 
implementation costs increase, and since fixed costs are extensive, smaller projects 
could be at a disadvantage (Michelowa and Jotzo, 2005; Krey 2005).  
 
 1.4  Justification and importance 
 
In addition to the concern that developing countries may be allocated emission-
reduction targets (and the requirement therefore to investigate possible proactive 
recommendations to comply with these targets), many benefits from the CDM have 
been highlighted in international circles. As illustrated in the literature above, these 
include: financial inflows, and returns, improved balance of payment, technology 
transfer and replacement of inefficient technology (UNEP, 2004). Cost savings 
through energy conservation, hedging against risk, development of environmentally 
friendly markets and job creation have also been mentioned. In light of the above, 
there are very definite social, economic and environmental advantages which would 
justify embarking on CDM projects. 
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1.5  Hypothesis 
 
A central question for this research is that, given the potential emission-reduction 
targets in 2012 for developing countries, and in particular SA, how appropriate is the 
CDM project cycle to energy management, climate mitigation and overall sustainable 
development? 
 
1.6  Aims and Objective 
 
The aim and objective of the study was to identify the current implementation of the 
CDM project cycle steps in South Africa for a selected number of companies and 
sectors. Furthermore, the appropriateness and effectiveness of these steps, as well 
as the possible opportunities, constraints and bottlenecks were researched. The 
intention is to improve the body of knowledge in order to mitigate these issues 
/constraints that key stakeholders may be having, and share best practices / benefits 
in order to develop the market further, where appropriate.  
 
 
 
Key Questions in the Study 
 
The following questions were used to explore and probe: 
 
1.  The current perception of the Clean Development Mechanism within selected 
companies and other interested parties. 
2. At what stage of implementation of the CDM project cycle, are the current 
projects? 
3. How effective has the design of the project cycle been? 
4.  What are the current opportunities for developing CDM projects? 
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5.  What are the current frustrations, concerns and constraints in registering and 
developing CDM projects? 
6.  Finally, suggestions for improvement to the process were sought (see also 
Appendix 2 for examples of the questions used in the study). 
 
1.7  Study Area 
 
One-on-one as well as telephonic interviews with appropriate stakeholders were 
conducted in the Gauteng and Western Cape areas. There is some CDM activity in 
the Kwazulu Natal area, as well as other parts of the country, but these parties could 
not be contacted. In cases where stakeholders were geographically distant (such as 
the Western Cape), and particularly where they were not available for telephonic 
interviews, the questionnaires were emailed. 
 
1.8 - Methodology 
 
 A short proposal was developed using a preliminary literature study, in order to 
glean the necessary background information. This included formulating a standard 
set of questions which would be presented to interviewees during a pilot study, as 
well as an interviewee list. This proposal was then presented to the Wits Ethics 
committee in order to ascertain whether it would comply with the requirements and 
principles as determined by the university. While waiting for approval, a short pilot 
study was conducted to assess the clarity and usefulness of the questions for the 
final study. Upon approval from the Wits Ethics committee (for further details see 
Appendix 11), a few modifications were made to the final questionnaire, and it was 
emailed as well as presented in person to various interviewees. In some cases 
telephonic interviews were also conducted. The selection of interviewees was based 
on a list of project owners and developers that are registered with the Dept of 
Mineral Affairs and Energy, as well as NGO’s, energy consultants, selected 
companies  and other interested and affected parties that had some experience in 
the CDM project cycle. While interviewing the respective stakeholders, they referred 
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me to other interested and affected parties, which allowed me to extend my list of 
prospective interviewees. All the interviewees that were contacted were extremely 
willing to complete the questionnaire, except for one, who had time constraints. 
 
As of June 2006 there were 32 projects that had been reviewed by the DNA 
(Department of Mineral Affairs and Energy), of which three CDM projects that has 
been registered in South Africa, seven more are at the validation stage, and another 
22 at the PIN stage (Project Information Note) (Tyani, L., pers com ). The interviews 
conducted were confined to those key stakeholders that have had experience with 
these projects. Approximately 24 interviews were held, as these were the only 
available contact persons that have participated in CDM projects. 
 
1.9  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the responsibilities of developing countries become clearly evident. 
Many developing countries have made progress towards limiting emissions through 
reduction of fossil fuel subsidies and advocating the use of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. South Africa’s emission intensity is high, and is one of the top 20 
emitters of greenhouse gases, mostly owing to its dependence on coal, and is the 
biggest consumer of electricity in Africa. Eventually all countries, including 
developing ones, would need to reduce their emissions. Furthermore, South Africa 
would be well placed to host Clean Development Mechanism projects owing to the 
strength of its economy, extensive infrastructure and wealth of natural resources. 
 
South Africa has developed a national climate strategy, which recognizes that 
climate will have adverse effects and adaptation is necessary. It also alludes to the 
fact that poverty eradication and job creation is a priority, while promoting 
sustainable social, economic and environmental development needs. This integrated 
climate response strategy will ensure that climate issues become fundamental 
components of government policies and practices. 
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Considering the above initiatives and the concerns that emission targets could be 
set for companies or sectors through incentives and regulations, Carbon Trading 
could become a very important practice for companies, and in fact the country at 
large. 
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CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
There is wide-ranging literature on the origins, function and implementation of the 
Clean Development Mechanism. As a precursor to this, the Kyoto Protocol, 
signed at the third conference of the parties (COP3), established commitments 
and greenhouse gas emission-reduction targets for industrialized countries for 
the period 2008- 2012 (Ellis and Treanton, 1998). Moreover, this agreement 
requires industrialized countries to consider ways to minimize adverse effects on 
developing countries (whose economies are dependent on export and 
consumption of fossil fuels), through mechanisms such as funding, insurance 
and transfer of technology (Babiker et al., 2000).  
 
Market-based approaches, such as emissions-trading have been proposed and 
adopted as alternatives to “command and control” legislation (Sonneborn, 2004). 
This market-based mechanism would serve to limit the liability associated with a 
corporate or nation’s release of carbon into the atmosphere, since it would 
provide them with an opportunity to mitigate their carbon emissions (Sedjo and 
Marland, 2003). Since the Marrakech accords were instrumental in describing the 
“Modalities and Procedures” around project-based mechanisms, they deserve 
mention, and have allowed for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Sustainable development is a distinguishing feature of CDM projects, and 
ultimately determines its acceptance and success.  Some of the sustainable 
development criteria are illuminated, with the associated barriers and possible 
solutions recommended. Project- eligibility criteria are clearly important, and in 
South Africa there are a multitude of different types of projects that could justify 
CDM investments. Sink projects such as afforestation and deforestation have 
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been accepted at COP 9 in Milan. They are considered as temporary credits, and 
there is some controversy and issues surrounding their use. Many institutions 
have contributed to the development of the CDM especially the Conference of 
the Parties, the CDM Executive Board, the Designated Operational Entities, the 
Designated National Authorities, NGOs, financial institutions, insurers, project 
Owners and other stakeholders. Other players in the CDM market include the 
Prototype Carbon Fund and the Dutch CERUPT. Voluntary trading schemes 
include the UK, New South Wales, and the Chicago Climate Exchange are a step 
in the right direction especially in countries who have not totally embraced the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNEP, 2004) (see Appendix 4 for further information). 
 
The CDM project cycle is complex, and requires  project-design and formulation 
(through a project design document- PDD), host country approval (through the 
Designated National Authority – which is the DME in this case),  validation by a 
certified Operational Entity, and registration with the CDM executive board, 
project financing (through investors), monitoring ( through the project 
participants), verification and certification (by another independent operational 
entity), and the issuance of certificates from the  CDM Executive  Board (UNEP, 
2004; EDRC, 2002; Cdmguide.net, 2005). Baselines and additionality are 
important concepts and are discussed at length. Project Financing and funding is 
provided primarily through loans or grants. 
 
The market potential of CDM credits and pricing is set by market forces, and is 
affected by the various associated risks. Transaction costs affect the Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) (see Appendix 5 and 6 for further information), and are 
often quite high owing to the need for multiple approval steps. Simpler 
requirements have been established for small scale projects, and bundling of 
these projects reduces costs (see Appendix 7 for further information). Every risk 
has an associated cost of mitigation, and these are compared and contrasted 
especially with regard to CDM projects. Should non-compliance occur, 
enforcement mechanisms have been designed to deter potential transgressors 
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(see Appendix 9 for further information). Carbon taxes have been proposed as 
alternatives to emissions-trading, but the recommendation is that tax rates are 
set higher than the emission-reduction credit price (UNEP, 2004). 
 
2.2  The Kyoto Protocol and Market-based Mechanisms 
 
The Kyoto Protocol allowed for the development of an international emissions-
trading and project-based mechanism (EcoSecurities, 2002). This provided a 
flexible, cost-effective way to trade the rights to emit greenhouse gases between 
industrialized countries, or between industrialized and non-industrialized 
countries.  Industrialised countries included developed countries and countries 
with Economies in Transition – i.e., Central and Eastern Europe. These countries 
are termed Annex 1 (those having non-binding commitments to reduce their 
GHG emissions) or Annex B countries (having legally-binding emission-reduction 
obligations). For practical purposes, Annex 1 and Annex B countries are 
considered to be the same (Ecosecurities, no date available). Non-industrialized 
countries are termed Non-Annex 1 countries. 
 
 Within the trading system, one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent is deemed to be 
the tradable unit. Credits could be claimed from emission-reduction specific 
projects (such as using clean energy technologies – i.e. solar, wind, biomass, 
hydro etc) (see Appendix 3 for other technological options for the mitigation of 
carbon dioxide) and can be traded under this project-based mechanism on world 
stock exchanges. According to IETA, (2005, 12) ‘the Kyoto protocol prescribes 
that industrialized and economies in transition should not exceed the GHG 
emission targets during the first commitment period i.e. between 2008 and 2012’.   
 
The structure of the Carbon Market is based on the premise that one entity will 
pay another entity for a carbon credit, in order to meet its emission-reduction 
targets (IETA, 2005). The payment can be via mechanisms such as direct 
investment in the project (i.e., cash), provision of new technologies for clean 
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projects, or even shares. This has led to the formulation of various mechanisms 
of trading, namely Joint Implementation (J1), Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Emissions-trading (ET). There are two basic types of carbon 
transactions – allowance based transactions and project-based transactions. 
Allowance-based transactions occur where allowances such as Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) from Russia or Ukraine (economies in transition) are 
allocated under the Kyoto protocol, or EU allowances are allocated under the EU 
Emission trading scheme (EU ETS). These are less risky since they are 
government-issued. These allowances can be transferred between countries (if a 
particular country has a surplus) or used to offset their own emission-reduction 
targets. The EU ETS entered into operation in 2005 (IETA, 2005), and is a 
European specific market for GHG emission allowances.   
 
There are other markets trading in greenhouse gas allowances in other countries 
as well – such as the UK emissions-trading system, the New South Wales 
trading system (Australia) and the Chicago Climate  Exchange (USA) (IETA, 
2005) (see Appendix 4 for further details). The USA and Australia have not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but have domestic policies internally to reduce 
greenhouse gases. Ultimately these “non-Kyoto regimes” might be linked with the 
Kyoto regimes, but there is currently no clarity on that issue (IETA, 2005). A 
‘Linking Directive’ provides the governance for the relationship between the 
Kyoto Protocol and the EU ETS. In essence, the Kyoto protocol covers trading 
throughout the world, while the EU ETS is European based. Under this linking 
directive, ERUs and CERs can be imported into the ETS making it more broad-
based (IETA, 2005; de Witt Wijnen, 2004).  
 
There are many benefits for linking the allowance and the credit market, but 
largely it is one of price. If they were not linked, the allowances (e.g., AAUs from 
Russia and Ukraine) would flood the market and reduce the market potential for 
credits (JI and CDM) (Jepma, 2003; IETA, 2004). Surplus AAUs held by Russia 
and the Ukraine cannot be exchanged for EU allowances (IETA, 2004). The EU 
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ETS is an excellent example of a government supported emissions-trading 
system (Proegler, 2004). Only carbon dioxide emissions are covered during the 
first trading period (2005-2007) and the allocation of carbon dioxide allowances 
are governed by each country’s submission of National Allocation Plans (NAPs). 
Here each member state sets targets and allocates allowances to each 
installation e.g., fuel generator, oil refinery, paper and pulp manufacturing etc 
(Meilinger, Meyer and Steinbrecher, 2004).  
 
The EU ETS is the single largest market for greenhouse gas emission 
allowances. EU countries are also allowed to fulfill their commitments jointly and 
can enter into regional agreements with each other in order to reach these 
commitments. This mechanism is called “Regional Bubbles”. Members of EU 
countries have formulated a “Burden-sharing Agreement” (see Table 2) whereby 
some member states, i.e., UK and Germany have committed to an emission-
reduction of over 20%, in contrast to others- for example Portugal and Greece 
are allowed substantial emissions increases. In the event of failure to achieve 
this joint commitment, each EU country is individually responsible for the 8% 
target, in compliance with the Kyoto Protocol (Laroui et al., 2004). The Burden-
sharing agreement was based on principles of “equity and according to common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities “(Shin, 1998, 525). 
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Table 2: Burden-sharing Agreement (After Laroui et al., 2004, 4) 
 
Member State Specific emission-reduction in EU 
Bubble (1% of 1990 GHG emissions) 
Austria -13% 
Belgium -7% 
Denmark -21% 
Finland 0% 
France 0% 
Germany -21% 
Greece +25% 
Ireland +13% 
Italy -6% 
Luxembourg -28% 
Netherlands -6% 
Portugal +27% 
Spain +15% 
Sweden +4% 
UK -21% 
 
Auctioning has been suggested as a way to implement the Burden-sharing 
Agreement, where any member state would have the same opportunity to buy 
the permits they need.  Revenues received could be used to promote energy-
efficient investments, research and development or investment in other GHG 
abatement projects. The potential barriers to this would be that business may 
reject the additional costs imposed on them to purchase these credits, and rather 
prefer the Grandfathering method: This is the free allocation of permits to current 
emitters. The suggestion is not to base the allocation on historic emission levels, 
or per capita (since some sectors could be overcompensated), but rather on a 
percentage reduction on current emissions (Vesterdal and Svendson, 2004). 
 
Project-based transactions are where a buyer purchases credits from a project 
running in a host country, where the host country either does not have to meet 
any formal emission-reduction obligations, or has surplus credits available owing 
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to that project. Project-based emission-reductions are more risky especially if 
they have not been registered or delivered (Cogen et al., 2004). 
 
JI refers to a project-based trading mechanism between two industrialized 
countries.  It allows the trading of ERUs or Emission-reduction Units. There is a 
fast track (Track 1) and a slow track (Track 2) mechanism for JI Projects -if the 
eligibility criteria for the fast track are not met (Van der Gaast, 2003). JI Host 
countries will be mainly central and eastern European countries (Woerdman, 
2000). Technology transfer is optional for JI projects, but mandatory for CDM 
Projects (Woerdman, 2000).  
 
CDM refers to emission-reduction projects between Annex 1 (Developed) and 
non-Annex 1 (Developing) countries. It is believed that abatements costs are 
lower in transition countries and developing countries, so the carbon market 
should institute global efficiency gains but very importantly, these projects must 
contribute to sustainable development, perpetuate clean technologies and 
provide new sources of (government and private) investment  in the non-Annex 1 
host country (IETA, 2005). All projects must be independently certified. The credit 
obtained is known as a CER or Certified Emission-reduction. These can be 
banked from the year 2000, and used during the first commitment period (2008 – 
2012) (De Witt Weijen, 2004).  
 
ET or Emission Trading allows Annex B countries to transfer portions of their 
Assigned Amounts (AAs) of GHG.  This allows for countries that have not 
exceeded their limits, to transfer the excess capacity to countries which have 
exceeded their limit. (Ecosecurities, 2002),  Any party is allowed to transfer or 
acquire ERUs , CERs and AAUs, if it is party to the Kyoto Protocol, has 
established its assigned amount, can estimate its emissions , uses a national 
registry and regularly submits its inventory (de Witt Weijnen, 2004). As part of the 
linking directive, both ERUs and CERs can be used to meet obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol (IETA, 2005), and once credits have been issued, there is no 
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difference between them and EU allowances or AAUs. The most important 
benefit of the linking directive is that it will reduce overall cost of compliance for 
all EU members (Jepma, 2003).  Banking (other than in CDM projects) is 
currently not allowed, although from research done, it has been shown to reduce 
costs, since cost savings can be traded over time as well as improving flexibility 
(Schleich et al., 2006). 
 
JI projects have to conform to a “basic set of rules which include environmental 
effectiveness, cost effectiveness, equity and ethics, flexibility, practicality, respect 
for the sovereignty of states” (Illum and Meyer, 2004, 4). As with all emission-
reduction mechanisms, JI projects should have as an overall objective, the 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the minimal use of “hot air” which is 
surplus Kyoto units from Russia and Ukraine (Illum and Meyer, 2004). 
 
For projects to qualify as CDM projects, they need to demonstrate valid 
mitigation of carbon dioxide emissions, and need to conform to certain eligibility 
criteria (Ecosecurities, no date available). Firstly, the host country needs to 
approve the project, based on the fact that it aligns with and contributes to their 
sustainable development policy. Secondly, emissions-additionality has to be 
proven (UNEP, 2004). This is the difference between business as usual 
emissions (the baseline) and emissions owing to the project. Obviously the 
project should display reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Both CDM and J1 
Projects need to calculate their additionality. Baseline setting is highly complex 
and great uncertainty still remains in determining accurate levels. This is mostly 
because political, financial, regulatory, and economic factors can influence it. 
Knowledge of the socio – economic and macro- economic trends in the energy 
market needs to be known. Ultimately, all projects should lead to measurable, 
valid and sustainable reductions in emissions, resulting in an overall 
environmental benefit. Also, environmentally-sound projects should incentivise 
foreign direct investment and the transfer of technology (Rentz, 1998). In order 
for the project to be successful, environmental performance in achieving carbon 
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dioxide reductions should exceed legal requirements, future developments, and 
historical precedents.  
 
When considering the market potential and issues surrounding CDM projects, it 
appears as if CERs generated by these CDM projects will compete with other 
Kyoto mechanisms in the international market. The same applies to JI projects. 
Only if surplus Kyoto units from Russia and Ukraine (Hot Air) are limited, will the 
CDM projects be competitive (IETA - Margaree consultants, 2004).  
 
2.3  The Marrakech Accords 
 
The practical implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was still to be decided upon, 
and the Marrakech Accords (signed in November 2001) were instrumental in 
achieving this. Decisions from the seventh session of the conference of the 
parties (or COP 7) elaborated on the broad principles of the Bonn agreement 
(previous COP meeting) (Pew Center, 2006). Predominantly the main areas of 
discussion were the operating regulations for the ETS, CDM and JI, accounting 
procedures for transferring emissions units under all three mechanisms, creation 
of emission units for sink credits amongst others (Pew Center, 2006). It allowed 
for the prompt start of CDM projects so that projects commencing in 2000 could 
be eligible for CDM or JI projects. Crediting for CDM projects would be valid from 
2000, while for JI projects, only from 2008 (Chen, 2003).The adaptation fund was 
formulated, whereby 2% of the CERs issued would be directed to that fund. 
Nuclear projects were completely excluded for CDM and JI projects owing to 
their controversial nature.  
 
Other important decisions taken at Marrakech included a country specific ceiling 
on credits from forest management (69.87 MtCO2 per year), a cap on CDM 
projects (limit to 1% of base year emissions, and only afforestation and 
reforestation projects would be considered). Rules for LULUCF (Land Use Land 
Use Change and Forestry) were defined as well (Forner and Jotzo, 2002). It was 
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also decided that there would be no quantitative limit on the use of CERs and 
ERUs , while ERUs, CERs, AAUs may be transferred with and between registries 
(Chen, 2003). Compliance was also discussed including the consequences and 
legal ramifications of non-compliance. Unilateral CDM was approved, allowing a 
developing country to initiate and run CDM projects without Annex 1 country 
involvement, and then sell the resulting certified emission-reductions (IETA, 
2005). Also, emission-reduction credits were created for carbon sinks, although 
they were limited to an overall cap of 33Mt C per year (Forner and Jotzo, 2002) 
and full tradability was now allowed between the mechanisms, as mentioned 
above. 
 
2.4  Comparison of CDM and JI projects to International Emissions-trading 
 
Compared to International Emissions Trading (IET), some of the studies have 
argued that both CDM and JI projects will be more effective, efficient and 
politically acceptable (owing to avoidance of redistribution of property or user 
rights) (Woerdman, 2000). They also allude to the fact that trade in “hot air” from 
Russia and Ukraine could result in false reductions under IET. They believe that 
transaction costs may increase for IET owing to onerous trading rules and hybrid 
trading system design. Also, CDM and JI would enjoy competitive advantage 
over IET as a result of them being cheaper to implement (Woerdman, 2000). 
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2.5  Benefits, Barriers and possible solutions for CDM and JI projects 
 
Barriers and Benefits of CDM Projects 
 
Some of the noteworthy benefits of CDM projects are that currently CERs are 
cheaper to purchase than other emission-reduction units, and can be banked 
from the year 2000 (in other words, projects with valid credits from the year 2000 
can be used from 2005 onwards). They are valid for both the first trading period 
of the EU ETS (2005-2007), as well as for the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), therefore even have an advantage over JI projects 
(Gupta, 2001) and can be sold throughout the world, not just in the EU. If 
sufficient volumes are purchased, the transaction costs can be reduced 
(Mortimer, 2004). Based on practical experience from the Sulphur dioxide 
allowance trading scheme in the USA and some existing literature, “Emitters 
facing large abatement costs, will in general prefer to buy allowances from the 
market if prices are lower than the cost of implementing in-house measures, 
while emitters with low abatement costs will have incentives to cut emissions 
beyond their targets and sell the surplus with a profit” (Christiansen and 
Wettestad, 2003, 4). Consequently, if CDM projects consistently provide low cost 
abatement opportunities, they will enjoy a captive market. 
 
Further benefits from CDM projects are based on the premise that developed 
countries could reduce their greenhouse gas-abatement costs by investing in 
relatively cheaper projects in developing countries. Developing countries in turn 
benefit from increased financial inflow and returns, improved balance of payment, 
job creation, advancing national development goals, technology transfer and 
replacement of old inefficient technology with new sustainable, environmentally-
friendly technologies (UNEP, 2004). Enormous cost savings would be realized 
through energy conservation, efficiency, as well as renewable energy projects. 
From an environmental perspective, the potential benefits are huge such as 
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reduced air, water and soil pollution, owing to less fossil fuel use, protection of 
biodiversity and generally resulting in conservation of these critical resources 
(UNEP, 2004). 
 
CDM projects may potentially become more expensive than JI projects, if the 
stipulation that 2% of the value of the CERs should be set aside for adaptation 
and administration costs is applied. Taxes (including CER taxation by host 
countries (could be up to 10%), and an adaptation fund levy (2%)) on CDM 
projects could limit CDM supply resulting in some developing countries not 
embarking on CDM projects if the credit prices are very low (Michaelowa and 
Jotzo, 2005). Another concern would be if “Sustainable Development” is 
interpreted too strictly and increases the price of CDM projects (see more detail 
below). Other issues affecting the sale of CDM projects could involve transaction 
costs, and institutional rigidities (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005; Kim, 2003; 
Tangen and Heggeland, 2003; OECD, 2004).  Transaction costs increase as 
implementation costs increase, and since fixed costs are extensive, smaller 
projects could be at a disadvantage (Michelowa and Jotzo, 2005; Krey 2005).  
 
Other opinions suggest that the non-participation of the USA and the availability 
of “hot air” from Russia and Ukraine further contributes to the problem of low-
priced CERs (Kim, 2003). They also feel that the complex and lengthy approval 
process for CDM projects serves to increase the transaction costs (OECD, 
2004). In addition, the detailed operational process of CDM projects could result 
in slow speed of implementation and reduction in CDM credits (Chen, 2003). 
Limited capacity for running CDM projects and ineffective institutional 
frameworks, are other important factors (Chen, 2003; Singh, 2006). Lack of 
resources, time, knowledge and funding could limit the development of 
renewable energy projects (Martinot, 2001). Other concerns relating to the 
certifying authority have been that these third party monitors may know less 
about the complexities of these projects than the investing parties and recipients 
of the CERs (Singh, 2006). They may also be unable to design a contract to 
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establish trustworthy and truthful information regarding investment intentions. 
This may encourage unjustified investments (Fischer, 2005). Finally, political 
stability is critical to the success of CDM projects (Jotzo and Michealowa, 2002; 
Singh, 2006). 
 
Besides the barriers mentioned before, other constraints for CDM projects 
revolve around the fact that with new technologies, new markets, products and 
projects there is some apprehension and aversion by financial institutions to 
provide financial assistance and support (EDRC, 2002; Singh, 2006). This may 
be able to be overcome through provision of detailed design documents, and 
demonstration that thorough research has been done through competent 
personnel. Other barriers encountered as described in Table 3 have been lack of 
technology, staff competence, large risks to investors and lack of experienced 
management. In South Africa, support for renewable electricity projects has been 
lagging, perhaps owing to absent or lack of clarity in policy frameworks. Project 
developers have provided convincing motivations that carbon finance and 
technology and capacity transfer would alleviate these issues. Other experts 
argue that strict application of sustainable development criteria, and sustainable 
development impact assessments merely complicate the issue, add to the 
transaction costs, and make CDM projects less attractive to international 
investors (UNEP, 2004). Opinions from the opposite side argue that this makes 
for well-conceived and designed projects (UNEP, 2004).  
 
 
Barriers and Benefits to JI projects 
 
From the literature, it is apparent that the barriers to JI projects are very similar to 
these for CDM projects, however in particular, baseline uncertainty and 
complexity appears to be at the forefront of concerns. A number of approaches 
for baselines have been proposed such as project specific baselines, default 
matrix approach, technology matrix approach, benchmarking, investment 
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analysis methods and a systems model approach (Begg et al., 2001). Further 
research would be required into these models, as they may even be appropriate 
for CDM projects. As with all projects, project performance uncertainty is 
mentioned, as well as the accuracy of technical and financial data, and social, 
environmental and political factors. Some case study projects encountered some 
negative effects from JI projects such as increases in carbon monoxide 
emissions from oil to biomass conversions, increase in waste production from oil 
or gas conversion to biomass, and increases in transport requirements for some 
oil to biomass conversions (Begg et al., 2001). Further risks to host countries 
(from JI projects), were equity issues especially where there was low institutional 
capacity, poor environmental regulations, and limited access to capital and 
resources. 
 
 
Some of the benefits from JI projects (other than GHG emission-reductions), 
were noticeable reductions in sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. 
Suggestions for possible solutions to the baseline uncertainty issues included 
regular baseline revision, standardized assessment procedures, limited crediting 
life, partial credits and restriction of types of projects (to reduce uncertainty). 
Institutional safeguards were proposed in order to address the equity and lack of 
capital and resources constraints, highlighted above (Begg et al., 2001). These 
solutions could certainly be considered for CDM projects, and the requirements 
for sustainable development could address this as well. 
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Table 3: Barriers that could be addressed by CDM investment (After EDRC, 
2002, 7) 
 
Potential Barriers Examples 
Technological Risks for the provision of the technical service for 
equipment 
Technical risks such as technology performance, resource 
availability 
Technology has never been demonstrated in the host 
country 
Organizational/ 
legal 
Substantial obstacles to receiving direct investment 
Policies that subsidize coal, natural gas or heat 
Financial Lack of long-term risk capital 
High cost of capital 
Exchange rate risks 
High transaction costs and risk of not recovering pre-
investment costs 
Demonstration of new business model(e.g. energy service 
company) 
Market Raw material supply risks 
Unpredictable price trends 
 
These barriers and benefits will be explored more deeply through a detailed 
study of the CDM project cycle, and where possible, suggestions provided to 
overcome certain of these barriers. 
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2.5.1  Barriers to CDM projects in South Africa 
 
Many of the barriers mentioned before apply to South Africa, but most noticeable 
would be the restricted capacity and supply of physical and human resources, as 
well as inefficient governance, limited leadership and decision-making processes 
(Kim, 2003). According to Kim (2003), other important factors would be the 
conflicting opinions of stakeholders and investors. Some stakeholders have not 
been convinced of the benefits of CDM projects  for South Africa since they feel 
that developed countries might seize all the cheaper projects (“Low-hanging 
fruit”), leaving the more expensive opportunities for the host country to use when 
they need to take on emission targets.  Also large private industries may 
potentially be threatened by the impact of CDM on the coal industry, as well as 
on locally developed technology (Kim, 2003). Other concerned stakeholders 
have felt that social and development issues should be the primary objective for 
CDM projects, while investors have indicated that financial benefits should be 
paramount. This could result in dysfunctional relationships between stakeholders 
and investors, and sabotage the effort behind the CDM (Kim, 2003). 
 
 
2.6  Sustainable Development 
 
Another very important distinguishing feature for CDM projects (which differs 
from J1 and ETS), and which ultimately determines its acceptance and success, 
is its adherence and compliance to the host country’s sustainable development 
goals and criteria (EDRC, 2002). Host countries have the mandate to screen and 
exclude projects that do not meet these criteria. At a local level, authorities can 
select projects that meet national development goals as well as providing 
economic development, social equity and environmental sustainability (UNEP, 
2004). CDM projects could be rejected on the basis of their development 
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additionality (Kim, 2003). Although the financial and environmental benefits are 
important, CDM projects are expected to address the social benefits as well. 
 
Some of the sustainable development criteria (UNEP, 2004) (see Table 4) would 
include issues such as job creation, equity, empowerment, participation, poverty 
eradication, environmental improvement and enforcement of regulations. Other 
issues that should be covered are rural and human development and 
sustainability of projects. However, one of the constraints is that whatever host 
countries consider as their development priorities, will determine how sustainable 
development is applied, and this may not necessarily achieve the desired 
objective. Another hurdle to overcome, would be to ensure consensus is 
achieved between investors and stakeholders (Kim, 2003).  Stakeholders 
(including government, industry and civil society) believe that the use of local 
skills, goods and services should be paramount whereas investors are more 
cautious. They insist that they would like to use the most effective workers, who 
are the most skilled. Many investors feel that it is easier to purchase local goods 
and services and provide training, than to employ local resources (Kim, 2003). 
Further to that, the UN commission on sustainable development proposed more 
than 100 indicators to assist host countries when evaluating their projects. These 
indicators have been designed to be comprehensive and reflective of the various 
dimensions, consistent with requirements, yet provable and measurable (UNEP, 
2004). 
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Table 4: Examples of Sustainable Development Criteria identified by host 
countries (after UNEP, 2004, 18) 
 
Social Criteria 
Improve Quality of Life 
Alleviate Poverty 
Improve equity 
Economic Criteria 
Provide Financial returns to local entities 
Result in a positive impact on balance of payments 
Transfer a new technology 
Environmental Criteria 
Reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels 
Conserve local resources 
Reduce pressure on local environments 
Provide improved health and other environmental benefits 
Meet local renewable energy portfolio standards and other environmental policies 
 
2.6.1  Barriers to Sustainable Development and possible solutions to constraints 
 
There does not seem to be a standardized, well-accepted approach or 
methodology for implementing sustainable development within any particular 
country (Holm Olsen, 2005). It appears as if the priorities for different 
stakeholders, are different and as a consequence, more powerful stakeholders 
entrench their views and beliefs, overriding the weaker, less powerful ones (Holm 
Olsen; Kim 2003). Conflicts may also arise owing to differences in expectations 
of local stakeholders and international investors (Kim, 2003). Another issue 
encountered is competition amongst developing countries for their share of the 
CDM investment resulting in less strict application of sustainable development 
criteria (Holm Olsen, 2005).  
 
It also appears as if CDM projects with high development benefits struggle to find 
finance (Holm Olsen, 2005). This has led to the conclusion from the research 
done (Kim, 2003), that sustainable development benefits could be a hindrance to 
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attaining the spirit of CDM. Some experts have argued that the evaluation of 
sustainable development impacts is simply an additional burden, and financially 
hamper the project by adding to the transaction costs. Others have come to the 
same conclusion and have said that application of inflexible sustainable 
development criteria could disperse potential investors (Holm Olsen, 2005). As a 
counter argument, many say that this would result in well-researched and better-
designed projects, which ultimately align with national development goals 
(UNEP, 2004).  
 
A growing body of evidence has also advocated a clear connection between 
CDM, access to energy and the Millennium Development Goals. Further to that, 
renewable energy projects, and energy-efficient projects aimed at households 
could minimize poverty (which is a sustainable development goal), as well as 
assist with achieving the Millennium Development Goals (inter-alia job creation, 
education, equality, rural health and environmental quality) (Singh, 2006). More 
research into this topic would certainly provide interesting results. 
 
Possible Solutions to constraints around sustainable development 
 
One possible solution to some of the constraints around criteria for sustainable 
development would be to apply the SouthSouthNorth (an NGO) matrix tool which 
uses a combination of a checklist and multi-criteria approaches (Holm Olsen, 
2005).  According to Holm Olsen (2005, 8), it is ‘based on a scoring system, 
where quantitative values are assigned to each criterion based on selected 
quantifiable indicators. The scores can be added and generate a total score for 
each CDM project assuming equal weights to all indicators’. A criticism of the tool 
is that it is based on scores which are assigned subjectively (Holm Olsen, 2005). 
Another tool was designed by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) called the 
Gold Standard. This varies the multi-criteria approach, and ensures that only high 
quality CDM projects are approved. It uses the sustainability assessment tool 
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from the South South North Matrix tool, but requires that an EIA is done, and that 
stakeholders and the public are consulted. 
 
Some experts feel that investors could pay a higher price for CERs which have 
conformed to the required sustainable development (SD) criteria, and use this to 
enhance their reputation. NGOs and academic or research institutions could 
inspect projects to ensure that high SD criteria are applied, while rewards could 
be administered to projects implementing the Gold Standard. Another option 
would be for international standards for SD to be negotiated which could become 
mandatory for these projects. (Holm Olsen, 2005) If proper, well-designed tools 
are used to assess sustainable development criteria, and assign specific 
weightings to them, this could assist with approval of CDM projects. Other 
suggestions to mitigate some of the barriers would be to provide dedicated 
investment funds for high quality carbon credits which have high-sustainable 
development benefits. Support for sectoral CDM, may be another option, where 
certain sectors which have high development benefits, are given preferential 
support (Holm Olsen, 2005). 
 
Another interesting piece of research has suggested that it is likely that smaller 
projects (in developing countries like Nepal) such as biogas, improved cooking 
stoves, micro-hydropower, and improved water mills could significantly contribute 
to the Sustainable Development of a country. These projects (which have not 
been the focus of international organizations) have an overwhelming potential of 
meeting the criteria and objectives of the CDM by providing rural livelihoods, 
alleviating poverty, and contributing to improvement of health and education 
(Singh, 2006). This has been largely overlooked, and would be well worth further 
investigation. 
 
Some of the institutions that have been instrumental, and have contributed 
greatly to the success of CDM projects, are expounded upon in Appendix 11. For 
further details please review this section.
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Eligibility and participation 
 
All parties (both Annex 1 and non-Annex 1), must meet the following criteria on 
order to participate in CDM: They must participate voluntarily, they must establish 
a national CDM authority (designated national authority or DNA), and they must 
have agreed to or ratified the Kyoto protocol. Over and above that, Annex 1 
countries should have an assigned amount established, national allocation plans, 
have developed a national system for the estimation of greenhouse gases, a 
national registry,  conduct annual inventories, and a financial system for the sale 
and purchase of emission-reductions. There are many requirements for CDM 
projects, but two fundamental ones are additionality and sustainable 
development. A definition from article 12 of the Kyoto protocol, states that 
additonality is “reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur 
in the absence of the activity”. This additionality is with reference to a baseline 
which is calculated as business as usual emissions. These projects must be 
relevant, provable, measurable and provide valid mitigation of climate change. 
Sustainable development is critical to the approval and success of these projects 
and encompasses social, economic and environmental factors. 
 
Types of eligible projects, technology share and projects that could attract CDM 
investment 
 
Nuclear energy projects do not qualify for CDM projects owing to their 
controversial nature. Sink projects that are acceptable would be afforestation and 
reforestation. Only 1% of the baseline emissions of Annex 1 countries are 
allowed to originate from sink projects. Table 5 below describes the types of 
projects that could attract CDM investment. 
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Spread of technology within eligible emission-reduction projects  
 
In Figure 1 the spread of types of technology globally within emission-reduction 
projects is seen to be overwhelmingly based on Halofluorocarbon destruction, 
with methane and nitrous oxide second. Biomass energy, hydro and landfill gas 
capture are joint third. 
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Landfill gas capture Hydro
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Energy efficiency Animal waste
Forestry (LULUCF) HFC
N2O Other
 
 
Figure 1: Technology Share of Emission-reduction Projects Jan 2004- April 
2005 (in percent of total volume contracted) 
(After IETA: States and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2005, 24) 
 
 
In Southern Africa, and in particular South Africa there are a multitude of different 
types of projects that could justify CDM investments.  Further to that, in Table 11, 
detailed project activities are described for each sector. 
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Table 5 Projects that could attract CDM investments (after EDRC, 2002, 3) 
 
Energy Supply Gas fire power generation 
 Cleaner coal power generation technology 
 Hydro-electricity to replace coal-fired power stations 
 Co-generation (biomass or fossil fuel based) 
 Renewable electricity (eg wind, photovoltaics, biomass) 
and other renewable energy(eg biogas) 
 Switch of synthetic fuel feedstock from coal to gas 
 Use of forest and agricultural waste to generate 
electricity and heat 
Manufacturing Conversion of boilers from coal to gas 
 Industrial energy efficiency 
 Structural change to less energy and emissions 
intensive industries 
Mining Industrial energy efficiency 
 Reducing methane emissions from coal mines 
 Control of dump fires 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
Afforestation and reforestation (during the first 2008-
2012 commitment period) 
 Improved management of natural woodlands (not yet 
included in the CDM) 
 Control of fires (not yet included in the CDM) 
Transport and 
communications 
Improved public transport 
 Improved urban planning and traffic management 
 Improved vehicle efficiency 
 Vehicle fuel switching 
 Switching from road to rail transport 
Residential, 
commercial and 
government buildings 
Energy-efficient appliances 
 Solar water heating 
 Fuel switching in households and commercial boilers 
 Energy-efficient building design 
 Energy management 
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Buyers of Project-based credits 
 
Governments and industry are the prime candidates for purchasing project-based 
emission-reductions, and from the research done until April 2005, most of the 
purchases have come from Europe. For further details see Appendix 8.  
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Figure 2: Market Buyers (Share of volume of emission-reductions 
purchased) Jan 2004 – April 2005 (After IETA: States and Trends of the 
Carbon Market, 2005, 21) 
 
Sellers of project-based credits 
 
As of April 2005, the largest seller of emission-reduction credits has been Asia 
(Approximately 45%), with Latin America second (approximately 35%). A large 
number of projects have been approved by the Indian DNA, but since these are 
unilateral CDM projects (no Annex B/1 buyer identified yet), they do not reflect as 
credits sold yet (IETA, 2005). From Figure 3, a graphical depiction of the projects 
which have been validated and registered with the CDM Executive Board, it can 
be seen that the three largest suppliers of projects are India, Brazil and Chile 
while Africa has been lagging. This picture has changed somewhat in that South 
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Africa and Uganda have recently registered a few CDM projects, with Nigeria, 
Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia actively working on some. In South Africa, 
local businesses such as SAB and Anglo American have embarked on unilateral 
CDM projects. The intention appears to be to use these to offset their emission 
targets in Europe, or to sell the credits to market buyers (Africainvestor, 2005). 
China and Mexico are emerging markets and have a large number of projects in 
the pipeline (IETA, 2005). China and India are expected to account for 60% of 
the CDM market share (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). 
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Figure 3: Location of Emission-reduction Projects (in share of volume 
supplied) (After IETA: States and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2005, 22) 
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2.7  CDM project cycle 
 
Having given a detailed account of benefits and constraints of CDM projects 
internationally and in South Africa, attention now turns to a key focus of this 
report, which is the CDM project cycle. It has been labeled as complex, by some 
critics, but is nevertheless detailed and comprehensive. The CDM project cycle 
(as depicted in Figure 4) requires  project design and formulation (through a 
project design document- PDD), host country approval (through the Designated 
National Authority – which is the DME in this case),  validation by a certified 
Operational Entity, and registration with the CDM executive board, project 
financing (through investors), monitoring (through the project participants), 
verification and certification (by another independent operational entity), and the 
issuance of certificates from the  CDM Executive  Board (UNEP, 2004; EDRC, 
2002; Cdmguide.net, 2005). 
 
CDM Project Registration
2 years
 
 
Figure 4: Graphical depiction of the CDM project cycle (Blignaut, 2005) 
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The PDD is a comprehensive document, and requires in-depth descriptions of 
the project activity, purpose, terms of operation of the project, list of parties 
involved,  location  and geographical information regarding the project, 
identification of project activity category, description of the transfer of safe and 
environmentally-friendly technology, details of how GHG emissions will be 
reduced, information on funding – either public or private funding (however if 
public funding , it should not divert official development assistance), and 
confirmation that the project is not a ‘debundled‘ component of a larger project 
(UNEP, 2004). 
 
The baseline methodology should include a justification on the choice of 
methodology, details of how this project reduces the emissions below the 
baseline (and is therefore additional), specific mention of the project boundaries, 
and an overview of the development of the baseline. Each new baseline 
methodology (as well as monitoring methodology) must be approved, by the 
Executive Board. Since a very select number of methodologies are available on 
the UNFCCC database, new baseline methodologies will be considered by the 
Methodology Panel. They will then undergo a desk review by a panel of experts, 
and be discussed at the next meeting of the Executive Board. Should the 
particular methodology be approved, then it can be used for the project, and 
subsequent CDM projects with similar characteristics, may implement it as well. 
The Executive Board is responsible for developing guidelines for these baseline 
methodologies which will assist in project preparation (CDMguide.net, 2005). 
These guidelines clearly describe the CDM rules, while ensuring consistency, 
transparency and predictability. They insist that reductions in emissions should 
be proveable, measureable and reflect reality. Baselines should be applicable to 
different geographic regions, project categories, and be applied in a standard 
manner. In particular, guidance is given on the definition of project categories 
that show similar methodological characteristics, and methodological tools which 
will ensure that relevant methodologies are selected. Advice is also given on 
boundary determination, national policies and scope of baselines (UNEP, 2004). 
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In addition when describing the baseline methodology, reference should be made 
to the project category (for small scale CDM) or methodology (normal CDM) from 
the UNFCCC CDM website. In all circumstances, (unless extensive justification is 
provided otherwise), an output-based (CO2 –eq/ unit of output), or product-linked 
definition of baseline values should be used (UNEP, 2004). 
 
The reasoning for the choice of methodology, should be clearly defined and it 
should be based on: 
 
1. Existing actual or historical emissions 
2. Emissions from an economically-attractive technology 
3. Average emissions from similar project activities, whose performance rates in 
the top 20%, and that have occurred in similar circumstances and environments. 
(Small scale projects are afforded simplified calculations for baseline 
determination). 
 
 Business as usual baselines could be set artificially high, resulting in inaccurate 
emission calculations or overestimation of project credits (Figure 5). By the same 
token business as usual baselines could be set too low, resulting in a 
conservative project credit. Further to that, other inaccuracies could arise where 
the calculated baseline due to the project is higher than the true baseline which 
results in an underestimation of the project credits (Figure 5). 
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Artificially High baseline
True Baseline
Conservative Baseline
Calculated path of 
project net emissions
True path of project net 
emissions
Project 
start
Time (yr) Project end
Activities applied if the mitigation project had 
not been implemented
Annual 
net 
emissions 
of GHG 
(Mg C eq
yr)
Buffer 
project credit
Conservative project credit
Overestimation of 
project credit
 
 
 
Figure 5: Activity scale showing the notional relationship between 
artificially high, true and conservative baselines, as well as calculated and 
true project net emission paths. An artificially high baseline results in an 
overestimated greenhouse gas credit (after Gustavsson, 2000, 941) 
 
 
Additionality 
 
There are two types of additionality testing – environmental and financial 
additionality (EDRC, 2002).  The environmental additionality of a project should 
be able to show valid reduction of GHG, which is additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the activity (UNEP, 2004; EDRC, 2002). To demonstrate 
the environmental additionality of a project, one could indicate that the project 
type is not common practice (UNEP, 2002), or alternatively do a qualitative or 
quantitative review of potential options, and a description of why the non-project 
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option is more likely.  Another way would be to prove that the technology used 
was the most appropriate for that project. Financial additionality on the other 
hand checks to see that there is no diversion of official development assistance - 
i.e., the funding must be additional to official development assistance (EDRC, 
2002).  In contrast, some studies have proposed that CDM can complement FDI 
investments and contribute to further carbon dioxide reductions. They believe 
that existing FDI could be invested in technology transfers of energy saving 
technologies (Kaneko et al., 2006). 
  
Since it is not possible to prove “what would have happened otherwise”, 
uncertainties in baselines are not easily eliminated. They should however be 
environmentally feasible, providing long term emission-reduction benefits, be 
simple and relatively cheap to formulate, be verifiable, and provide economic 
benefit to investors (EDRC, 2002). A disproportionally high number of emission 
credits will be generated, if the baseline is set higher than the emission level that 
would have occurred in absence of the project. Conversely, the emission credits 
would be disproportionally small if the project baseline is set lower than the 
emissions level. This could result in disqualification of eligible projects. Finally it 
is important to note that baselines cannot be verified after the project has 
commenced, but the logic and assumptions can be monitored (EDRC, 2002). 
 
Historical baselines appear to generate the most actual reductions (and therefore 
credits), while industry average over-allocates reductions compared to actual 
reductions. For large reductions, historical baselines provide the most credits, 
while for smaller reductions the industry average baseline produces the most 
(Fischer, 2005). Any quantifiable increase in emissions, either outside the 
boundary of the project or timeframe, owing to the project is known as leakage. 
(The project boundary is the defined area where emission-reductions or 
sequestration take place) (EDRC, 2002; UNEP, 2004). For example, in the case 
of biomass projects, the project could divert biomass from other users, resulting 
in increased fossil fuel use (Lehmann, 2004). If there is a positive leakage, i.e., 
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reduced emissions outside the boundary, or after the project ends, this is known 
as spillover. Often leakage is an unintended consequence, for example where an 
extensive energy-efficiency program reduced the price of electricity, with a 
rebound increase in demand for power. In contrast, spillover may become an 
intended consequence of a project and marketed as such. In some cases, 
carbon reductions would have occurred without the presence of the CDM project. 
Here, additionality could not be proven, and the emission-reductions should be 
included as part of the baseline (EDRC, 2002). Some project developers have 
suggested that leakage effects are not comprehensively addressed (Lehmann, 
2004). 
 
Project specific baselines measure emission-reductions from one project. As with 
all baselines, they are complex to develop and considerable uncertainty 
surrounds their determination (EDRC, 2002). Multi-project baselines are 
baselines set for a group of similar projects. They are aggregated and set across 
geographical and sectoral areas. These baselines may only be appropriate for 
some project types. They are often used as benchmarks, activity indicators or 
intensity standards. Multi-project baselines offer some notable advantages since 
the burden of estimating emission-reductions is shifted either to the regulatory 
entity of a carbon trading scheme, or to another project consolidator (Sathaye et 
al., 2004). This can largely reduce the transaction costs. Hybrid baselines are 
based on standardizing the method or value of one or more components of the 
baseline (EDRC, 2002). Static baselines are set for the duration of the project 
and so reduce the uncertainty around the amount of credits being generated by a 
project. They are also less onerous from a monitoring, reporting and 
administrative perspective, as well as reducing the costs. Dynamic baselines are 
regularly reviewed and are therefore more accurate, thus ensuring additionality of 
a project. Inherent in this is some uncertainty of number of credits that will be 
generated by the project (EDRC, 2002). 
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Host country approval 
 
The host country is responsible for screening projects, and ensuring that it meets 
its own requirements. A Designated National Authority (DNA) has to be 
appointed for this, and in the South African case it is the DME. They have a 
number of tasks and duties to fulfill, which includes ensuring the project complies 
with national policy and regulatory regimes. They also have to develop national 
criteria to assess additionality and sustainability of projects, as well as 
elaboration of guidelines and procedures for project approval (UNEP, 2004). 
Most importantly, before the DNA approves the project, they need to ensure that 
the project developers have participated voluntarily in the project, and that the 
project conforms to the sustainable development goals. They should also provide 
CDM information within the country, train and develop capacity, promote the 
country as a CDM host, as well as promote financing of projects (OECD, 2004). 
Based on the above, a formal letter of approval is given to the project developer 
and that is submitted with the project design document, and supporting 
documentation to the DOE. 
 
Validation 
 
The project design document needs to be reviewed by an independent certified 
auditing or accounting firm (at this present moment only Price Waterhouse 
Coopers are certified in SA, although South African projects may utilize any DOE 
throughout the world). However, before this is done, they need to ensure that all 
participants in the project have approved and are in support of the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNEP, 2004). They would then request input and feedback from local 
communities, NGOs and other interested parties.  In addition they will validate if 
the project activity will in fact reduce the GHG emissions, assess the 
assumptions and plans, including the monitoring plan and the baseline. An 
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environmental impact analysis must have been done, and if significant impacts 
were found, a full environmental impact assessment should be done. 
 
Registration 
 
Once the DOE has validated a project, then the registration process is fairly 
seamless (EDRC, 2002). The Executive Board will register the project and 
publish a list of approved projects on their website. A registration Fee needs to 
be paid to the CDM Executive Board for registration of CDM projects. This 
ranges between 5000 USD (small Projects) to 30 000 USD (Large projects) 
(UNEP, 2004). 
 
Project financing and funding 
Loans, equities and grants are required to fund CDM projects. Loans and debts 
would primarily be sourced from financiers, public markets (bonds), bank loans 
etc. Company shareholders provide funding (equity), and this may be obtained 
internally (sponsors), or externally from public or private markets, while grants 
are provided by governments and institutions (these do not have to be repaid). 
These often only cover a percentage of the costs, and are provided if the project 
is aligned to the donor’s goals and objectives. Another mechanism is upfront 
payment for CER purchases, although as part of the ERPA (emission-reduction 
purchase agreement), they are often required to pay on delivery of credits 
(UNEP, 2004). 
 
Unilateral, bilateral, multilateral and a mixture of the previous three (open 
architecture) sources of funding could be used to develop CDM projects (EDRC, 
2002). Diversion of official development assistance should not occur (UNEP, 
2004). In unilateral sources of funding, the project owner assumes all the risk of 
design and implementation, as well as whether carbon credits will be generated.  
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With bilateral sources of funding, the owner partners with an investor (usually 
from an industrialized country).The investor can either provide upfront funding, 
and in essence purchases the credits prior to their issue, or the investor can 
purchase shares in the project, and benefit from the profits or losses, and receive 
the predetermined number of carbon credits when they are issued (EDRC, 
2002).  
 
The benefits of bilateral funding for the owner are that they would receive funding 
without having to take a loan, and the investor could also supply technology and 
expertise. The possible disadvantage is that the owner may have less control 
over the details and design of the project, and may lose if a fixed price for the 
carbon credit is agreed upon upfront. For this, an Emission-reduction Purchase 
Agreement (ERPA) is signed (EDRC, 2002). 
 
Multilateral sources of funding are where multiple investors collaborate to form a 
joint CDM fund which will finance multiple projects. Any carbon credits from these 
projects will be distributed pro rata amongst the investors. The benefits for 
investors are that they can spread the risk across selected projects. The World 
Bank Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF), Community Development Fund and the Bio 
Carbon Fund are examples of multilateral sources of funding, where the World 
Bank acts as a fund manager (EDRC, 2002).  
 
Monitoring 
 
A monitoring plan needs to be developed which will ensure a systematic 
surveillance of the project’s performance, and to measure whether the objectives 
have been achieved according to relevant target indicators. Effectively, 
monitoring evaluates the project’s effect on greenhouse gas emissions and other 
non-emission factors such as costs - economic, social and environmental and 
looks to improve planning and measuring processes (EDRC, 2002). The plan 
should include a description on how the data will be collected, what type of data, 
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and how it will be recorded and kept as evidence (UNEP, 2004; Cdmguide.net, 
2005) .In particular, the data collected is needed to estimate the GHG emissions 
occurring within the project boundary and determine the baseline GHG 
emissions. Data is also required to assess the environmental impacts, including 
the impact across the boundaries (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Monitoring methodologies need to be approved by the CDM executive board, 
before being implemented by project participants, and a justification for the 
choice of methodology for that project is especially necessary (UNEP, 2004; 
CDMguide.net, 2005) 
 
Verification and Certification 
 
A certified Designated Operation Entity (DOE) needs to review and audit the 
reductions in GHG emission, and the conformance with the monitoring plan. The 
measured and monitored reductions and results need to be periodically audited. 
It also needs to verify that the projected CERs have been achieved according to 
the initial validation of the report. Once a detailed study has been done, a 
verification report can be produced to certify the number of CERs produced. 
Owing to a requirement for transparency and to prevent fraud, one DOE cannot 
perform both the validation and verification/ certification on the same project Only 
in the case of small scale CDM projects, can a single DOE perform both 
processes (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Certification is the written report that a specific project activity achieved the 
agreed GHG reductions in a specific timeframe. This serves as final acceptance 
of the project CERs and is made available to the public. The report includes a 
request for issuance of the necessary CERs (UNEP, 2004). 
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Issuance of CERs 
 
The CDM Executive Board will issue the CERs to the respective parties. 2% of 
the value of the CERs will be paid to the CDM executive board for adaptation 
costs. The UNFCCC secretariat will keep track of all CERs being issued though a 
CDM Registry. Once the CERs have been issued, they are placed in a pending 
account and later moved to the owner’s account (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Finally, it is important to note that the crediting period for CDM credits (according 
to the “modalities and procedures for CDM”), is either a period of maximum 10 
years, or a period of maximum 7 years, with a potential for renewal for two 
additional periods (UNEP, 2004). Credits obtained from the year 2000, may be 
used in the first commitment period. The crediting period starts after registration 
of the project. Most project developers prefer the longer crediting period –i.e., 7 
years with option of renewing twice, however the risk is that the baseline may not 
be valid after 7 years. A DOE would need to revalidate this, but the project 
developer would be required to update the data used to set the baseline, rather 
than changing the whole baseline methodology (this should not be changed). 
Sink projects have a longer crediting period – either 30 years, or 3x 20 years.  In 
some cases the project life may be shorter than the crediting period, and in this 
case it will no longer earn CERs (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Risks for CDM projects 
Every risk has an associated cost of mitigation and in particular, risks for CDM 
projects include the normal project risks, as well as CDM specific risks. 
Greenhouse gas trading is seen as higher risk, owing to the uniqueness of it 
currently (EDRC, 2002). A risk-mitigation plan should be included in a feasibility 
study and should describe how these risks are minimized or overcome. The risks 
should be identified, and importance with respect to financial or technical 
performance evaluated (EDRC, 2002). 
 62 
 
Project risks would include: Construction risks (i.e. exceeding time and cost) and 
operational risks (technology performance, market risk, political, legal, 
environmental and financial) etc. These risks relate to the performance of the 
project, and impact the ability of the project to deliver the necessary quantity of 
CERs (UNEP, 2004; IETA, 2005. As a consequence, development-focused 
projects could exhibit the greatest risk of non performance of a technology 
(Ecosecurities, 2002). Legal risks are the most complex, and liability for errors in 
calculation of emission-reductions or fraudulent reporting could prevent the 
project from being implemented (EDRC, 2002). Financial risk involves the 
possibility of parties reneging on responsibilities to pay loans, and/ or provide 
guarantees or insurance policies amongst others. Also, projects often need 
upfront funding, and depending on the contract negotiated, this may be difficult to 
get (Ecosecurities, 2002). Political risks revolve around issues such as new 
property laws, taxes, currency or foreign exchange problems and export 
restrictions. Environmental risks include possibilities of fines and penalties for 
pollution, rehabilitation costs and environmental audits. Force Majeure and other 
unforeseen circumstances can also pose a risk, therefore it becomes necessary 
to take insurance cover to minimize the losses in the event of this happening 
(EDRC, 2002). 
 
 CDM risks include policy risks and market risks. Policy risks refer to cases where 
the host country does not comply with the requirement of the Kyoto protocol, or 
that baselines procedures are not approved , or policy shifts at local or 
international level (i.e., regulations or tax changes, subsidies on fossil fuels) 
(UNEP, 2004; EDRC, 2002). Market risks refer to the fact that prices for CERs 
are unpredictable, and determined by market forces. Speculation and collusion 
can dramatically affect prices. Mitigation of risk would be through insurances and 
use of financial tools (UNEP, 2004). Also, participants could hedge their 
regulatory risks by embarking on a variety of projects, while subsequent 
 63 
developers may prefer to focus on proven and widely acceptable technology 
types, which are cost effective to reduce risk (IETA, 2004) 
 
As has been expounded on above, the CDM cycle is complex, yet at the same 
time comprehensive. Many stakeholders are involved, they are critical to the 
success of these projects, and they require in-depth knowledge of the intricacies 
of the carbon trading cycle in order to ensure each project produces the 
necessary credits. 
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2.8  Case studies of CDM projects in South Africa and Worldwide 
 
In order to illustrate the broad acceptance of CDM projects worldwide, as well as 
the growing interest of these projects in South Africa, some potential case 
studies have been evaluated. Many of these projects deal with energy efficiency, 
which are by their nature easier to implement. Other good case studies, which 
have already been implemented, as managed by SouthSouthNorth (an NGO) are 
demonstrated below. 
 
Volkswagen South Africa – reduced energy consumption (improved monitoring) 
 
Volkswagen South Africa manufactures approximately 80 000 cars annually. The 
vehicle bodies are pressed and formed on site. The Engine blocks are machined 
and additional components are combined to form complete engines. Electricity is 
required for air compressors, cooling towers, refrigeration equipment and lighting 
- but heavy fuel oil, liquid petroleum gas and some paraffin is also consumed. 
Several areas were identified for energy efficiency since the annual energy 
consumption is about 177,360 MWh. Purely by repairing compressed air leaks, 
turning off air compressors and lighting when not required, this resulted in 
savings of R2 million/year with an initial investment of R130 000.00. The carbon 
dioxide emissions were reduced by 15 000 tonnes per year (The CDM: a guide 
for potential participants in South Africa, 2002). 
 
Southern Electric plc – monitoring energy efficiency 
 
Another example of monitoring energy efficiency was with a UK electricity 
company –Southern Electric plc. Southern Electric has approximately 600 major 
substation sites. In order to protect the contents from frost and condensation, as 
well as to provide a comfortable working environment, they are heated with an 
adjustable wall-mounted thermostat. However, these thermostats are rarely 
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adjusted, resulting in continuous heating and wasting of energy. Southern 
Electric began a program in the 1990’s to install electronic controls which 
maintained a lower temperature, unless a push button was pressed, which gave 
additional heating for a timed period. When the energy saving was monitored, it 
was found that the annual savings was about 32 000kWh year (The CDM: a 
guide for potential participants in South Africa, 2002). 
 
Sasol Natural Gas Conversion Project 
 
The Temane/Pande gas fields in Mozambique have been developed and a 
pipeline to South Africa has been established. At Sasol Chemical Industries in 
Sasolburg, natural gas will replace coal for production of synthetic gas and 
chemicals. At Secunda, the Sasol Synfuels gasification process will continue, 
using coal as a feedstock, but in the future, natural gas will be used. GHG 
reductions will be realized at both plants. (The CDM: a guide for potential 
participants in South Africa, 2002). 
 
An apt illustration, of some of the CDM projects that are being run worldwide, is 
described by South South North (SSN). They are a Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) which was inspired by the passion and vision of mitigation of 
climate change through sustainable energy-efficient and clean energy projects 
(South South North, 2004). By coaxing investors into new ideas and drawing 
communities into trying new technologies, they managed to develop projects in 
Brazil (accounting for technology), Bangladesh (accounting for poverty), 
Indonesia (accounting for environment) and South Africa (accounting for 
people).These approaches covered the pillars of sustainable development (South 
South North, 2004).  
 
 
South South North was born out of the view that if “Southern countries” were not 
to take their own destinies in hand, it would all happen in the North. It started as 
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an exchange of technology and expertise between southern countries, and 
partnerships in the North. The concept of the South South North Project team is 
based on a partnership with a project developer. The team is composed of 
lawyers, bankers, scientists, engineers, community leaders and is led by a 
trained South South North project facilitator. In order to ensure transparency and 
strict adherence to the underlying principles, a  person from helio international 
oversees the entire process (South South North, 2004). 
 
Brazil 
 
These projects are technically complex, and experimental. The first project is 
experimenting with ways of converting used cooking oil, from a fast food chain, 
into biodiesel to fuel the garbage trucks that transport the city’s garbage to the 
dumps (a projected saving of 38500 tons of carbon dioxide over ten years). A 
second project harnesses biogas extracted from Rio’s landfills and through this, 
generates electricity for operating the landfill (a projected saving of 35000 tons of 
carbon dioxide over ten years). The third project uses solid waste to fuel a 
technologically innovative power plant (a projected saving of 365000 tons of 
carbon dioxide over ten years) (South South North, 2004). 
 
Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries on earth, and emissions are almost 
negligible, so there is almost nothing to trade. In view of this, some challenging 
projects have been chosen by South South North, i.e., solar home systems in 
rural areas, and electric vehicles in Dahar city. The solar home systems should 
project savings of 8600 tons carbon dioxide annually. The electric vehicles for 
public transport should save between 11000 and 14000 tons of carbon dioxide 
annually (South South North, 2004). 
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Indonesia 
 
Since it is an island nation, it is vulnerable to extreme weather, climate change 
and rising sea levels. SSN have chosen three projects to manage here. The first 
project proposes using cleaner engines, improved management of public 
transport, restructuring the routing and schedules and using alternative fuels. 
9600 tons of carbon dioxide should be saved over seven years. The next project 
is the Bandarjaya rice husk power plant project, which will generate 3 megawatts 
of electricity. Ten small rice mills producing 60000 tons of rice husk will supply 
8500 households with electricity. Emission-reductions will be about 14000 tons of 
carbon dioxide per year, for ten years. The last project uses combined solar, 
wind and biomass as an energy source for a processing unit, to dry food. 
Emission-reductions will be 9000 tons of carbon dioxide for ten years (South 
South North, 2004). 
 
South Africa 
 
South Africa will account for the people component of the sustainable 
development pillar. The first project fits low cost houses with ceilings, ceiling 
insulation, energy-efficient lamps and solar water heaters (projected savings are 
5500 tons of carbon dioxide annually). Another project is spearheaded by paper 
and pulp producers (Mondi), to use renewable energy (biomass) for its own 
needs (two smaller projects will recover 704000 tons and 69000 tons 
respectively, per year for ten years). A third project uses methane from a city’s 
landfill to provide clean fuel for local industries: projected savings are 900 tons, 
1246 tons and 1277 tons of carbon dioxide annually, respectively for three 
separate project activities (South South North, 2004). 
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Durban landfill gas to energy project 
 
The first emission-reductions purchase agreement in South Africa was signed for 
a landfill gas to energy project in Durban (PCF, 2004). Three landfill sites have 
been selected where gas will be collected. Electricity from the grid (mostly from 
coal-fired power stations) will be displaced by electricity generated from the 
landfill gas. The project consists of two components – the first is from the 
Mariannhill and La Mercy Landfill which will generate 700 000 tons of emission-
reductions. The second is from the Bisasar road landfill which will generate 3,100 
000 tons of emission-reductions. The project is run and managed by the 
department of cleansing and solid waste from eThekwini Municipality. The 
Prototype Carbon Fund will in addition pay 20 cents per ton for addressing the 
needs of the poor in Durban. Some of the activities that could be funded are 
waste management and recycling programs, training, education and skill 
enhancement, ultimately leading to job creation. The social benefits fund is 
expected to be approximately 760 000 USD, and will pave the way for developing 
the needs of the Durban communities (PCF, 2004). 
 
Brazil 
 
In addition to the South South North Projects in Brazil, there are other CDM 
projects running as well. Interestingly, carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil are 
amongst the lowest in the world (Ecosecurities, no date) relative to the large 
population and GDP. However, consequent to the economic growth, the 
emissions have been growing, owing to huge demands for energy. Brazil is a 
non-Annex 1 country, with no targets as yet, but nevertheless a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Currently hydro power produces approximately 97% of the 
national electricity, owing to few oil and coal reserves. In 1993, Brazil proposed 
that any new investments to initiate a decentralized approach to its power sector, 
would be based on fossil fuel thermal plants (Ecosecurities, no date). This, in 
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conjunction with the fact that a large number of municipalities in the Amazon 
region are not connected to the electricity grid (they use diesel), provides great 
opportunities for CDM projects for off-grid electrification. The steel and iron 
industries, would also benefit from CDM projects. Carbon finance would ensure 
faster deployment of clean energy technologies. Also, the inclusion of sink 
projects under the CDM is likely to elevate Brazil’s market share, along with other 
Latin American, tropical Asian countries and China (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 
2002). 
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China 
China is the second largest emitter of carbon dioxide (after the USA) and with a 
population of 1.3 billion people it is the most densely populated country (Tangen 
and Heggelund, 2003). As a consequence, it is the world’s largest coal producer 
and consumer and based on the vast coal supply has grown rapidly. After China 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg in 2002, four projects in quick succession were prepared and were 
ready to be implemented (Tangen and Heggelund, 2003). The one shortcoming 
was that an abundance of technical experts and engineers were involved in CDM 
projects, but market specialists and economists were conspicuously absent. 
Chinese authorities had not considered the huge opportunity for developing 
projects within Chinese companies and plants which would be more attractive to 
international investors and multinationals within China. Multinationals felt that the 
risk would be lower using well known suppliers and technologies on their own 
premises (Tangen and Heggelund, 2003). 
 
Unilateral projects were also not widely investigated by Chinese authorities, since 
they felt that upfront investment from international investors, as well as 
technology transfer, would not occur. Also at that time, no institutional system 
had been established for identification, approval and implementation of CDM 
projects (Tangen and Heggelund, 2003). To a large extent, China has been a 
late starter in CDM projects, compounded by lack of institutional support, little 
involvement of potential project developers, and a very low level of CDM 
awareness within local communities (Tangen and Heggelund, 2003). 
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 2.9  Conclusions 
 
 In this literature review, a study of the complexities of the CDM project cycle was 
undertaken, as well as the institutions and stakeholders which would contribute 
to the running of successful projects. The underlying benefits, constraints and 
potential solutions to the CDM cycle were investigated, and highlighted, with the 
view to comparing these international findings with local experiences.  
 
Some of the noteworthy benefits of CDM projects are that currently CERs are 
cheaper to purchase than other emission-reduction units, and can be banked 
from the year 2000. Further benefits from CDM projects are based on the 
premise that developed countries could reduce their greenhouse gas abatement 
costs by investing in relatively cheaper projects in developing countries. 
Developing countries in turn benefit from increased financial inflow and returns, 
improved balance of payment, job creation, advancing national development 
goals, technology transfer and replacement of old inefficient technology with new 
sustainable and environmentally-friendly technologies. 
 
 Some barriers to CDM projects include the fact that CDM projects may 
potentially become more expensive than JI projects, if the stipulation that 2% of 
the value of the CERs should be set aside for adaptation and administration 
costs is applied. Taxes on CDM projects could limit CDM supply resulting in 
some developing countries not embarking on CDM projects if the credit prices 
are very low. Transaction costs increase as implementation costs increase, and 
since fixed costs are extensive, smaller projects could be at a disadvantage. 
Some researchers feel that the complex and lengthy approval process for CDM 
projects serves to increase the transaction costs. Limited capacity for running 
CDM projects and ineffective institutional frameworks, are other important 
factors. Lack of resources, time, knowledge and funding could limit the 
development of renewable energy projects. Other concerns relating to the 
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certifying authority, have been that these third party monitors may know less 
about the complexities of these projects than the investing and recipients of the 
CERs. Finally, political stability is critical to the success of CDM projects. 
 
Possible solutions for the notoriously slow approval of projects would be to limit 
the number of project participants to the major parties (as listed on the PDD). 
The newly developed additionality tool should assist the DNA and DOE in 
providing an objective assessment of projects, and simplify the process, 
providing some relief for resource and time constraints. 
 
From the literature, it is apparent that the barriers to JI projects are very similar to 
CDM projects however, in particular, baseline uncertainty and complexity 
appears to be at the forefront of concerns. A number of approaches for baselines 
have been proposed such as project specific baselines, default matrix approach, 
technology matrix approach, benchmarking, investment analysis methods and a 
systems model approach. Further research would be required into these models, 
as they may even be appropriate for CDM projects. Some JI projects 
encountered some negative effects, such as increases in carbon monoxide 
emissions from oil to biomass conversions, increase in waste production from oil 
or gas conversion to biomass, and increases in transport requirements for some 
oil to biomass conversions.  
 
Some of the benefits from JI projects (other than GHG emission-reductions), 
were noticeable reductions in sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. 
Suggestions for possible solutions to the baseline uncertainty issues, included 
regular baseline revision, standardized assessment procedures, limited crediting 
life, partial credits and restriction of types of projects (to reduce uncertainty).  
 
Barriers to sustainable development are that there do not seem to be a 
standardized, well-accepted approaches or methodologies for implementing 
sustainable development within any particular country. Conflicts may also arise 
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from differences in expectations of local stakeholders and international investors. 
Other issues encountered are competition amongst developing countries for their 
share of the CDM investment resulting in less strict application of sustainable 
development criteria. Some experts have argued that the evaluation of 
sustainable development impacts is simply an additional burden, and financially 
hamper the project by adding to the transaction costs. 
 
One possible solution to some of the constraints around criteria for sustainable 
development would be to apply the South South North (an NGO) Matrix tool 
which uses a combination of a checklist and multi-criteria. Another tool was 
designed by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) called the Gold Standard.  
 
Many of the barriers mentioned before apply to South Africa, but most noticeable 
would be the restricted capacity and supply of physical and human resources, as 
well as inefficient governance, limited leadership and decision-making processes. 
Other important factors would be the conflicting opinions of stakeholders and 
investors. In addition large private industries may potentially be threatened by the 
impact of CDM on the coal industry (since renewable energy is more expensive, 
while energy derived from coal is cheaper), as well as on locally developed 
technology. 
 
Having shown the barriers, benefits and possible solutions as described by 
international and local literature, the results (from a South African perspective) in 
Chapter 3 will be compared and contrasted to these international findings. The 
intention is for these discoveries to add to the existing body of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER THREE - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In order to establish the current South African perception of CDM projects, 
certain key questions were asked of experts in the field (for further details see 
Appendix 1). Some questions were designed to establish context, while others 
were particularly relating to the major area of research which was ascertaining 
the benefits, the bottlenecks, and possible solutions to problems encountered (for 
further details see Appendix 2). The key questions asked in Table 6 below were: 
 
• What are the benefits and advantages of developing CDM Projects? 
• What are the constraints or bottlenecks around registering or developing 
CDM projects? 
• Do you have any suggestions that could improve or alleviate some of the 
concerns and constraints above? 
 
 Table 6 below therefore in essence describes the key questions asked, the 
responses and the number of correspondents that concurred with each answer. 
This was especially done to determine the importance or weighting of each 
answer. 
 
Table 6:  Interviewee perception of barriers, bottlenecks, benefits of the 
CDM project cycle and suggestions for improvements 
 
Question No of 
respondents 
concurred 
What are the benefits and advantages of developing CDM 
projects 
 
Answers  
Foreign Direct Investment 4 
Income from Carbon credits 3 
Corporate Social responsibility 4 
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Question No of 
respondents 
concurred 
New environmentally friendly  markets 5 
Marginal projects can go ahead 5 
Potential targets in 2012 – build capacity before subjected to 
penalties and taxes 
1 
Conservation of environment 5 
All parties benefit (Win –Win) 1 
Finance and technology upgrade 1 
Hedge against risk 1 
Sustainable development 3 
Economic development 1 
Job Creation 1 
Mitigate climate change 2 
Industry and politicians will become more aware of 
environmental matters 
1 
Incentive to develop environmentally friendly products and 
services 
1 
Meet Kyoto Protocol commitments 1 
Increased awareness within financial communities 1 
Question 2  
What are the constraints or bottlenecks around registering 
or developing CDM projects? What other concerns or issues 
do you have around these projects? 
 
 
Answer  
NGOs and Stakeholders could delay projects 1 
Not all countries have signed the Kyoto Protocol 1 
Ethical approach to CDM not always taken 1 
Institutional knowledge to be improved 3 
Technology transfer does not always happen 1 
Private companies have worked largely on their own 1 
Complicated CDM Process 5 
Costly and time intensive CDM cycle, with high requirements 2 
Bundling of projects produces no savings and increases risk 2 
Difficult to convince company executive board of benefits of 
CDM 
2 
Resource and time intensive CDM  process 9 
Uncertainty  and risk high owing to CDM being a new program 1 
Unsure what to do with credits –i.e. sell, bank etc 2 
Methodologies are limited, or unavailable, approval takes long 
with large risks and costs associated with them 
6 
Monitoring is an issue, with no local or international standards 1 
Baselines complex and take at least 6 months to develop 3 
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Question No of 
respondents 
concurred 
Additionality is difficult to determine 5 
Threat of “hot air” 1 
Large Price differential between CDM and JI 1 
Few projects and little experience in South Africa 1 
Long sales cycle 5 
Mismatched Project cycle to funding cycle 1 
Internal rate of return takes longer owing to additionality 1 
EIAs are rigorous and lengthy 5 
Lack of upfront funding and cashflow 6 
Limited number of DOEs 1 
Lack of clarity from DNA on the national agenda 1 
NGOs not forthcoming with information 1 
Large companies have a conservative view and are slow to 
adopt the CDM opportunity 
4 
Top management do not delegate authority to technical people 
to allow them to make decisions 
1 
Shareholders not willing to hand over credits 1 
Regulatory and compliance issues (Domestic approvals, CDM 
Executive Board bureaucracy, complex EIAs) 
8 
Uncertainty post 2012 7 
High transaction costs 4 
CDM Executive Board take too long 4 
CDM Executive Board decisions not transparent 1 
CDM Executive Board understaffed 1 
Lack of public sector and municipal awareness 2 
Delay of entry into force of Kyoto Protocol 1 
Mismatch between CDM planners and business priorities 1 
Lack of dialogue between scientists and academia 1 
Smaller projects can fail since they are less sustainable 1 
Projects can be contested internationally 1 
Multiple decision points in CDM cycle 1 
South Africa has a low cost of producing energy from coal 2 
Lack of awareness in commercial sector of carbon finance 1 
Sustainable development projects are good , but are too small 1 
Since CDM is a new program, stakeholders don’t take it 
seriously 
1 
Calculation of emission factors and sourcing of information from 
power producers is difficult 
1 
Question 3  
Do you have any suggestions that could improve or 
alleviate some of the concerns and constraints above? 
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Question No of 
respondents 
concurred 
Answer  
Sustainable development indicators should be weighted 1 
Clearer guidelines on monitoring standards should be made 
available 
1 
Government should provide more leadership i.e. subsidise 
projects, intervene where needed 
1 
Awareness of CDM should be improved 3 
South Africa should start planning for 2012 1 
The DNA and role players should revisit sustainable 
development criteria after at least 10 projects 
1 
Taxation of CDM credits should be absolved 1 
Restrictive Public Finance Management Act 1 
Baselines are so complex, so suggest that benchmarks are used 
to simplify baseline 
1 
Programmatic CDM should provide an efficient strategy and 
incentive programs for CDM 
1 
 Simplify CDM Cycle 1 
Clearer guidelines on governance of CDM projects should be 
provided, especially additionality 
 
It is easier for public sector projects to become CDM projects 
than smaller ones 
1 
Fears around the CDM market, post 2012 should be allayed 1 
Authorities should clearly indicate time frames associated with 
review processes and stick to them 
1 
Consider that not all projects should have to go through an EIA 
process (the EIA process causes significant delays) 
1 
Allow national accreditation agencies to accredit DOEs 1 
Apply only gold standard certification 1 
Communities should receive more benefits 1 
Government agencies should help small community projects 
collaborate together 
1 
Sink projects should not be allowed, they are too risky 1 
Industrial gases should be excluded in order to simplify process 1 
Additionality should be simplified 1 
The CDM Executive Board process should be speeded up 1 
Sellers clearing houses should be developed 1 
Financial institutions should help project developers more by 
providing upfront finance (to reduce the risk) 
1 
More donor and development funds should be provided 1 
South African local DNA should interact more with international 
DNAs to swap best practices and methodologies 
1 
Better Funding of CDM Executive Board 1 
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Question No of 
respondents 
concurred 
Active CER Spot Market 1 
Time taken to register projects should be shortened 1 
Reduce transaction costs through incentive schemes 1 
More assistance should be given to small scale projects i.e. to 
overcome barriers to entry 
1 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Several issues emerge from the results in Table 6. Having reviewed the existing 
international literature it becomes apparent that the perception of the CDM 
project cycle amongst South African stakeholders, project developers, NGOs and 
selected companies is not unlike their international counterparts. In a detailed 
assessment below, the differences, trends and patterns will be described, 
compared and contrasted. Broadly, the benefits and advantages of CDM projects 
from a South African perspective are similar to international literature in that 
financial, social, environmental benefits are clearly evident. 
 
Most respondents have indicated that foreign direct investment, income from 
carbon credits, development of new environmentally friendly markets, corporate 
social responsibility, sustainable development and conservation of the 
environment are key benefits to them (Figure 6 below). According to the 
Millennium Ecosystem assessment (a four year international scientific 
assessment of the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being), 
loss of ecosystem services will affect the framework conditions within which 
businesses operate (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). This has knock-
on effects on stockholder expectations, customer preferences, regulatory 
regimes, governmental policies, staff satisfaction and accessible finance and 
insurance (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
 
 79 
Extensive business opportunities will emanate as demand for mitigation of 
climate impact, or more efficient use of ecosystem services, increases. Company 
endeavours should be advised by the best scientific evidence available. 
Businesses could use this to their competitive advantage and become market 
leaders and innovators in new burgeoning environmental markets (Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Many companies are now recognizing their 
collective responsibility to the social and environmental facets of sustainable 
development. Reputation and image is becoming increasingly important for 
companies in order to attract key staff and customers who prefer working for, or 
purchasing products from socially and environmentally-responsible companies 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). If ecosystem services can pay for 
themselves, through the economic benefits of carbon trading, and other similar 
mechanisms, the outcome will be extremely positive for all stakeholders, 
business and the environment. 
 
Another important finding from the results of the above interviews is that marginal 
projects can now go ahead. This means that projects which otherwise would not 
have been profitable can be so now, owing to the additional revenue from carbon 
credits. This refers back to the above mentioned point, that companies are 
considering new environmental markets, as potential revenue streams, and if 
economic benefits from carbon credits attract their attention, then these markets 
will become main-stream.  Others interviewees have intimated that it would be 
important to build capacity, and hedge against risk before being subjected to 
penalties and taxes post 2012, (while benefiting from the financial and 
technology upgrade from these new projects). They felt that economic 
development would incentivise companies to manufacture environmentally 
friendly products, mitigate climate change, meet Kyoto commitments, as well as 
create huge job opportunities. Increased awareness amongst industry, politicians 
and financial communities would be a beneficial consequence. 
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It is important to note that the key benefits, as highlighted by interviewees in 
Table 6, and illustrated in Figure 6 would be: 
• Foreign direct investment (4 responses), 
• Corporate social responsibility (4 responses), 
• New environmentally friendly markets (5 responses), 
• Marginal projects can now go ahead( 5 responses) 
• Sustainable development (3 responses) 
• Conservation of the environment (5 responses) 
• Income from carbon credits (3 responses) 
 
Key Benefits from CDM projects in %
16.67
12.50
16.67
12.5020.83
20.83
20.83
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Income from credits
Corporate social responsibility Sustainable Development
New environmental markets Conservation of the environment
Marginal projects can go ahead
 
 Figure 6:  Key benefits from CDM projects in % (number of respondents concurred /total 
number of respondents) 
 
 
In comparison, the international literature states that some of the noteworthy 
benefits of CDM projects are that currently CERs are cheaper to purchase than 
other emission-reduction units. They can be banked from the year 2000, are valid 
for both the first trading period (2005-2007), as well as for the first commitment 
period (2008-2012). This would imply that CDM credits therefore even have an 
advantage over JI projects (credits from JI projects can only be used from 2008 
onwards) and can be sold throughout the world, not just in the EU. Further 
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benefits from CDM projects are based on the premise that developed countries 
could reduce their greenhouse gas abatement costs by investing in relatively 
cheaper projects in developing countries.  
 
The perceptions around constraints and bottlenecks in South Africa also do not 
deviate greatly from other research (see Figure 7 Below). Many interviewees 
have indicated that lack of resources, time and complexity of the CDM process 
could jeopardize the success of CDM projects. Since this is a relatively new 
initiative, skills and capacity are in short supply and need to be developed. 
Multiple decision points within projects also complicate matters, requiring in 
depth knowledge of project design, management, and the entire CDM project 
cycle. 
 
Regulatory and compliance issues (8 responses as indicated in Table 6) owing to 
either absent or inadequate laws restricting emissions, slow domestic approval of 
projects (owing to lack of domestic capacity), and inadequate clarity on the 
national agenda deserve mention. If legislation governing carbon emissions were 
stricter, or targets were allocated to polluting industries, the adoption of market-
based and other mechanisms would be greater.  
 
Lack of upfront funding and cash flow for projects (6 responses as indicated in 
Table 6) has been mentioned by interviewees, which according to them, is a 
restricting factor, especially for smaller CDM projects. A suggestion has been for 
more government support, grants and loans to be made available. Another 
concern is that there is often a mismatched project cycle to funding cycle, where 
financing is made available too late, and project developers are forced to take the 
risk and cost themselves. 
 
Uncertainty and substantially higher risk post 2012 (7 responses as indicated in 
Table 6) are hindrances to adoption of CDM projects. Since there has been no 
decision or communication regarding the validity of projects commencing post 
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2012, the window of opportunity for project developers to initiate projects is 
steadily decreasing. This has therefore not motivated prospective developers to 
search for opportunities that fall into this timeframe. 
 
Unexpectedly high transaction costs (4 responses as indicated in Table 6), 
(Ecosecurities have estimated that transaction costs could amount to 70 000 
euros) have inhibited most project developers. Transaction costs consist of pre-
operational costs (upfront costs), implementation costs (cost spread over the 
entire period) and trading costs. Interviewees have indicated that these costs 
have dissuaded many potential participants who were not willing to take the risk 
or cost. 
 
An extremely long sales cycle (5 responses, as indicated in Table 6) (some 
interviewees have quoted up to two years before any carbon revenue is made 
available) has been perturbing. Some project developers (2 responses, as 
indicated in Table 6) are not sure whether to sell or bank the credits, once 
received. Increasing awareness and training of actions to be taken during and 
after the project cycle would assist greatly. 
 
Complex baselines (3 responses from Table 6) and additionality calculations (5 
responses from Table 6) rank high in interviewee concerns. (These findings were 
also mentioned widely in the literature). Insufficient skill and knowledge in these 
matters often hinder project developers. Methodologies are limited, or 
unavailable (6 responses from Table 6), while approval takes long, with large 
risks and costs associated with them. Methodologies are available on the 
UNFCCC website, but until then are clouded in secrecy, slowing the adoption by 
other similar projects. Furthermore, no local or international standards seem to 
be available for monitoring. Although the international literature has advocated 
that transfer of technology (1 response from Table 6) is a key benefit of CDM 
projects, this does not seem to have taken place in South African CDM projects 
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Other criticisms have been directed at the CDM Executive Board who have taken 
too long to approve projects (4 responses from Table 6), possibly through 
understaffing and whose decisions have not been entirely transparent. Other 
complications arise owing to the fact that they do not meet as regularly as is 
desired. Pipeline projects can wait for long periods before being approved. In a 
similar vein, the interviewees have indicated that especially in South Africa, 
where there is only one DOE (Price Waterhouse Coopers), there is also an 
extensive wait for assistance from them (1 response from Table 6). 
 
The threat of “hot air” from excess allowances in Russia and the Ukraine, and a 
large price differential between CDM and JI projects has been mentioned as an 
encumbrance (JI ERUs are priced higher than CDM CERs possibly owing to the 
perceived higher risk in CDM projects). Finally, calculation of emission factors 
and sourcing of information from power producers has appeared to be rather 
difficult. 
 
Again in comparison, the international literature suggests that barriers to CDM 
projects include the fact that CDM projects may potentially become more 
expensive than JI projects, if the stipulation that 2% of the value of the CERs 
should be set aside for adaptation and administration costs is applied. Taxes on 
the profits of CDM projects could limit CDM supply resulting in some developing 
countries not embarking on CDM projects if the credit prices are very low. 
Transaction costs increase as implementation costs increase, and since fixed 
costs are extensive, smaller projects could be at a disadvantage. Respondents to 
international interviews also feel that the complex and lengthy approval process 
for CDM projects serves to increase the transaction costs. Limited capacity for 
running CDM projects and ineffective institutional frameworks, are other 
important factors. Lack of resources, time, knowledge and funding could limit the 
development of renewable energy projects. Other concerns relating to the 
certifying authority, have been that these third party monitors may know less 
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about the complexities of these projects than the investing and recipients of the 
CERs. Finally, political stability is critical to the success of CDM projects. 
 
An notable pattern which has not appeared in the literature, is the slow adoption 
(in South Africa) of large companies and acceptance of the benefits of CDM, 
difficulty in convincing company executives to embark on CDM projects, as well 
as unwillingness to delegate authority to technical staff. They are not easily 
convinced of the benefits of embarking on CDM projects. Private companies 
have worked largely on their own, with little sharing of best practices with other 
market players and NGOs have not always been forthcoming with information. 
More research has to be done in this area, since these would be missed 
opportunities and manifest as loss of market share compared to early adopters. 
 
Another interesting trend is a mismatch of opinion between scientists, academics 
and business as to the value of the CDM. More work has to be done in this area, 
in order to align viewpoints and mindset. South Africa is also in a unique position 
in that it is the forth largest producer of coal, produces 90% of its energy from 
fossil fuels (and inexpensively from coal), so unless the incentives for renewable 
energy and other energy-efficient technologies are emphasized, South Africa will 
continue to lag in the CDM market. As a consequence, there seems to be too few 
projects and little experience compared to other developing countries (South 
America, India and even Asia have been innovative in this regard). 
 
Sustainable development projects (see page 41 for detailed review of sustainable 
development) in South Africa appear to be controversial in that they either are 
too small or lack support and funding. An interesting constraint has been 
mentioned, where projects can be contested internationally, and could result in 
long delays in projects and perhaps even failure. Smaller projects seem to be 
less sustainable and more likely to fail. Further to that, few projects seem to be 
available, compounded by lack of experience, and methodologies (as mentioned 
above). Insufficient awareness in the commercial, municipal and public sector 
 85 
around CDM projects, seems to be prevalent. As a result some stakeholders 
have not taken CDM seriously. Funding (especially upfront) and cash flow as 
mentioned above seems to be particularly troublesome for project developers, 
increasing their risk and insecurity. 
 
Barriers to sustainable development in the international literature corroborate the 
above South African findings in that there does not seem to be a standardized, 
well-accepted approach or methodology for implementing sustainable 
development within any particular country. It appears as if the priorities for 
different stakeholders are different and as a consequence, more powerful 
stakeholders, override the weaker ones. Conflicts may also arise owing to 
differences in expectations of local stakeholders and international investors. 
Other issues encountered are competition amongst developing countries for their 
share of the CDM investment resulting in less strict application of sustainable 
development criteria. Some experts have argued that the evaluation of 
sustainable development impacts is simply an additional burden, and financially 
hamper the project by adding to the transaction costs. 
 
The international literature proposes that small project activities can be bundled 
(in order to reduce costs), or grouped together so that key aspects of CDM rules 
such as design, registration and verification can be addressed for the whole 
bundle rather than the individual projects. Also the following cost-reducing 
mechanisms would apply to small scale projects: simpler requirements for the 
project design document; simpler methodologies for developing the project 
baseline; simpler requirements for monitoring emissions; lastly, a single 3rd party 
verifier may undertake validation, verification and certification of small projects to 
reduce costs. 
 
In contrast to references from international literature, bundling of projects in 
South Africa does not appear to produce cost savings; on the contrary, it actually 
increases the risk. This is another area which would deserve further research, 
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since many South African projects are small scale, and should bundling prove to 
be unhelpful, this could certainly constrain CDM projects in South Africa. 
 
Institutional knowledge and experience have been mentioned as a concern, and 
lack of clarity regarding decisions and policies has been highlighted. Inter-
relationships between stakeholders have on occasion been problematic, with 
ethics issues and some reticence in collaboration amongst stakeholders, 
apparent. Shareholders often seem unwilling to hand over credits, while some 
stakeholders have tried to delay certain projects. 
 
Therefore the key constraints as highlighted in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 7 
would be: 
• Complicated CDM process (5 respondents) 
• Resource and time intensive CDM process (9 respondents) 
• Limited methodologies with large risks and costs (6 respondents) 
• Complex baselines (3 respondents) 
• Additionality difficult to determine (5 respondents) 
• Long sales cycle (5 respondents) 
• EIAs rigorous and lengthy (5 respondents) 
• Lack of upfront funding and cash flow (6 respondents) 
• Large companies slow to adopt CDM opportunities (4 respondents) 
• Regulatory and compliance issues (8 respondents) 
• Uncertainty post 2012 (7 respondents) 
• High transaction costs (4 respondents) 
• CDM Executive Board takes too long (4 respondents) 
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Figure 7: Key constraints for CDM projects in % (number of respondents concurred /total 
number of respondents) 
 
 
Suggestions from interviewees for improvement have been illuminating (see 
Figure 8 below). Most notable (owing to the credibility of the interviewee) is a 
weighting for sustainable development indicators (certain important indicators 
would count more than others), benchmarks to be used to simplify baselines 
(here comparisons against international best practices would be helpful) or, sink 
projects to be excluded owing to their risk (storage of carbon in forests is 
temporary by nature, therefore risky). 
 
Other suggestions have been sellers clearing houses, industrial gases to be 
excluded to simplify the process, and programmatic CDM to provide an efficient 
strategy and incentive program for CDM. In particular, seller’s clearing houses 
involves pooling of credits, in order to increase the price for sellers, and provides 
a single portal for buyers to acquire them. Programmatic CDM refers to multiple 
similar projects being run under one PDD, utilizing the same methodology (this 
would reduce the transaction costs). Industrial gases have been controversial, 
since in some countries, these fugitive emissions have been legislated against 
 88 
(especially HFCs), or even taxed so the additionality and sustainable 
development value is questionable. 
 
Another important suggestion is that taxation of the profits from CDM credits 
should be abandoned, and the apparently restrictive Public Finance Management 
Act to be improved. Since South Africa has a rather strict and rigorous EIA 
process causing significant delays, interviewees have proposed that not all 
projects should go through this process, but some other method be used to 
ensure that environmental criteria are met. 
 
Similar recommendations have been made to those from the international 
literature including simplifying the CDM cycle and additionality process, as well 
as shortening the time taken for registration of projects. In addition the speed of 
the CDM Executive Board process has been notoriously slow, and requests to 
improve on this have been raised. 
 
From a South African perspective, requests for more donor and development 
funds, subsidies from government and more assistance to small scale projects to 
overcome barriers to entry have been mentioned, while financial institutions 
should assist project developers with more upfront finance. Incentive schemes to 
reduce transaction costs, gold standard certification (based on best practice) and 
national accreditation agencies to accredit DOEs (which would allow more DOEs 
to be accredited) have been proposed to alleviate some of the barriers. Clearer 
guidelines on monitoring standards (also based on best practices), governance 
and additionality seem to be required.  
 
Most importantly, awareness and marketing of CDM should be improved 
especially in order to prepare for post 2012. More obvious leadership from 
government is necessary, with interventions where needed as well as clear 
indications of time frames for approvals, which are then adhered to. A proposal  
has been that the South African DNA should revisit Sustainable Development 
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criteria regularly (possibly after ten projects or so), as well as to interact more 
with international DNA’s to swap best practices and methodologies. Finally a 
CER spot market should be more active. 
 
One possible solution, from the international literature to some of the constraints 
around criteria for sustainable development would be to apply the 
SouthSouthNorth (an NGO) Matrix tool to which uses a combination of a 
checklist and multi-criteria approaches. These checklists would provide 
benchmarks for evaluation to ensure the project conforms to the necessary 
sustainable development criteria. Another tool was designed by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) called the Gold Standard. This varies the multi-criteria 
approach, and ensures that only high quality CDM projects are approved. It uses 
the sustainability assessment tool from the SouthSouthNorth Matrix tool, but 
requires that an EIA is done, and that stakeholders and the public are consulted. 
 
The key suggestions for improvements from Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 8 
would be: 
• Awareness of CDM to be improved (3 respondents) 
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Figure 8: Key Suggestions for improvement in % (number of respondents concurred /total 
number of respondents) 
 
3.1 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, compared with the international literature, the barriers to CDM 
projects in South Africa are similar, but some deviations such as slow adoption of 
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CDM by companies, inter-personal issues between stakeholders, and mismatch 
of opinion between scientists, academics and businessman have been noted.  
Suggestions from interviewees for improvement have been illuminating. Most 
notable is a weighting for sustainable development indicators, benchmarks to be 
used to simplify baselines or, sink projects to be excluded owing to their risk. 
Other suggestions have been sellers clearing houses, industrial gases to be 
excluded to simplify the process, and programmatic CDM to provide an efficient 
strategy and incentive program for CDM.  
 
In closing, these barriers do not seem to have changed dramatically over time, 
nor have the benefits, but there have been many new innovative suggestions for 
improvement, which may be well worth further study and research in the future. 
 92 
CHAPTER FOUR - CONCLUSION 
 
The Kyoto Protocol, signed at the third conference of the parties (COP3), 
established commitments and greenhouse gas emission-reduction targets for 
industrialized countries for the period 2008- 2012. Carbon dioxide emissions are 
by far the greatest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and the view is that 
they will continue to contribute the most for the foreseeable future; therefore they 
have been the main focus in all mitigation actions. Carbon dioxide emissions are 
produced almost entirely from fossil fuel use and therefore relatively easy to 
measure and monitor. Moreover, this agreement requires industrialized countries 
to consider ways to minimize adverse effects on developing countries (whose 
economies are dependent on export and consumption of fossil fuels), through 
mechanisms such as funding, insurance and transfer of technology. Importantly, 
this market-based mechanism would serve to limit the liability associated with a 
corporate or nation’s release of carbon into the atmosphere. The responsibilities 
of developing countries in mitigation of climate change are becoming increasingly 
significant, yet fraught with political controversy. Their projected greenhouse gas 
emissions are expected to exceed those of developed countries by 2020. 
Naturally, developed countries have requested that developing countries take 
considerably stronger action in order to prevent or at least alleviate these 
emissions. 
 
There is a growing viewpoint, that GHG emission targets could be set for 
companies or sectors through incentives and regulations within South Africa and 
other developing countries. It is also possible that GHG mitigation could be 
required by law and so carbon trading could become an important practice for 
companies. As a consequence, companies could pre-emptively include costs of 
GHG mitigation in new projects, consider renewable energy and energy 
efficiency and develop new energy-efficient technologies. They could also set 
emission targets for themselves and monitor their performance against these 
targets, as well as construct carbon trading systems within their companies. 
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Environmental concerns for South Africa are that certain areas of the country will 
become hotter and drier, while other areas will become wetter. It is also possible 
that crop production may be affected, with the maize triangle at great risk of non-
existence within the next two generations. 
 
South Africa has, in light of the above concerns, developed a national climate 
strategy, which is based on a number of principles: first and foremost, it 
recognizes that climate change will have adverse impacts, and adaptation is 
necessary. Development is an ever present requirement, as is growing the 
economy with the proviso that it remains competitive, therefore South Africa’s 
emissions will continue to increase. Sustainable social, economic and 
environmental development needs have to be promoted, while using locally 
available resources. In addition, poverty eradication and job creation will be 
addressed. This integrated climate response strategy should ensure that climate 
issues are part of government policies and practices. 
 
South Africa is very vulnerable since it is based on a fossil fuel economy, exports 
coal, and has not developed sufficient alternative technologies. In 1998, 90% of 
carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion originated from coal. South Africa 
produced approximately 194 TWh of electricity in 2000. This was mostly from 
coal-fired power stations which are largely owned and operated by Eskom. 
 
 Furthermore, South Africa would be well placed to host Clean Development 
Mechanism projects owing to its extensive network of roads and rail, at least 
seven deep water ports and large amount of natural mineral resources. In 
addition to that, it is the most technologically and economically advanced country 
in Africa. South Africa’s emission intensity is quite high, in relation to other 
developing countries and emitted 0.96kg carbon dioxide per dollar of GDP, while 
other non OECD countries emitted an average of 0.66. Despite a small 
population, South Africa is one of the top 20 emitters of greenhouse gases, and 
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this is attributed to its dependence on coal, production of synthetic liquid fuels 
from coal, large mining and industries heavily reliant on energy, as well as 
wastage of energy. From calculations done, it appears as if “South Africa 
consumes half of Africa’s electricity, with only 5% of its population”. 
 
As a result many industry associations have been researching climate change 
issues, in particular Sasol, Eskom, The chamber of Mines and the Chemical and 
Allied Industry Association (CAIA). Eskom is one of the largest national energy 
suppliers and dominates bulk electricity sales. It has been able to provide 
inexpensive electricity from the country’s plentiful coal supplies. 
 
Considering the above environmental concerns, potential emission-reduction 
targets, dependence on coal, excessive consumption of energy (compared to 
other developing nations), as well as the favourable conditions for hosting CDM 
projects, this study was launched in order to identify the possible barriers, 
constraints and possible suggestions for improvement. 
 
From the literature survey, as well as from discussions with experts in the field, it 
appears as if the issues we have encountered in South Africa have been 
experienced in other parts of the world. Commonly occurring concerns, seem to 
be that the baseline setting, additionality and entire CDM project cycle is 
complex. Resource and time constraints could jeopardize projects, transaction 
costs have been prohibitive (in some projects), compounded by lack of initial 
upfront funding. Bureaucracy from the CDM executive board has frustrated 
attempts to move projects along swiftly, and in some cases, the sustainable 
development criteria have been applied too strictly. Lack of methodologies, as 
well as huge risk and cost in developing new ones have been obstacles for 
project developers while clear guidelines on monitoring, governance and 
additionality have been conspicuously absent. Uncertainty around technical and 
financial data as well as project performance has clouded implementation of 
projects. Suggestions for improvement have been regular baseline revision, 
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standard assessment procedures, limited crediting life, restriction of certain types 
of credits, or partial credits. Application of the gold standard, and an additionality 
tool have been relatively new proposals to overcome certain of these constraints.  
 
Complexities around sustainable development include competition amongst 
developing countries for their share of the CDM investment, conflict and differing 
expectations of local shareholders and investors, powerful players overriding 
weaker ones, and no standardized, well-accepted approach to sustainable 
development criteria. Suggestions for improvement are that international 
standards should be negotiated for sustainable development, sectoral CDM 
should be applied where certain sectors with high development benefits are 
given preferential support and use of a sustainability assessment tool. Other 
suggestions have been to provide institutional safeguards to address equity 
issues, resource constraints and lack of capital. Thankfully there are also many 
benefits that have been highlighted in international circles. These include 
financial inflows, and returns, improved balance of payment, technology transfer 
and replacement of inefficient technology. Cost savings through energy 
conservation and job creation have also been mentioned. 
 
It is important to note at this juncture that the key benefits, as highlighted by 
interviewees in Table 6, would be: 
 
• Foreign direct investment (4 responses), 
• Corporate social responsibility (4 responses), 
• New environmentally friendly markets (5 responses), 
• Marginal projects can now go ahead( 5 responses) 
• Sustainable development (3 responses) 
• Conservation of the environment (5 responses) 
• Income from carbon credits (3 responses) 
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Issues that seem to be uniquely particular to South Africa are the slow adoption 
of large companies to accept the benefits of CDM, difficulty in convincing 
company executives to embark on CDM projects, as well as unwillingness to 
delegate authority to technical staff. More research has to be done in this area, 
since these would be missed opportunities and manifest as loss of market share 
compared to early adopters. Mismatch of opinion between scientists, academics 
and business should result in more research in this area, in order to align 
viewpoints and mindset. 
 
South Africa is also in a unique position in that it is the forth largest producer of 
coal,  produces 90% of its energy from fossil fuels (and inexpensively from coal), 
so unless the incentives for renewable energy and other energy-efficient 
technologies are emphasized, South Africa will continue to lag in the CDM 
market. As a consequence, there seems to be too few projects and little 
experience compared to other developing countries. Institutional knowledge and 
experience have been mentioned as a concern, as well as inter-relationships 
between stakeholders, ethics and some reticence in collaboration amongst 
stakeholders. Shareholders also seem reluctant to hand over credits. Notable 
suggestions for improvement have been a weighting for sustainable development 
indicators, benchmarks to be used to simplify baselines, sink projects to be 
disallowed owing to their risk, sellers clearing houses, industrial gases to be 
excluded to simplify the process, and programmatic CDM to provide an efficient 
strategy and incentive program for CDM. Another important suggestion is that 
taxation of CDM credits should be abandoned, CER spot markets to be 
encouraged and the apparently restrictive Public Finance Management Act to be 
improved.  
 
Observations which deserve mention and which contradict international views, 
are that technology transfer does not always happen, and bundling of projects 
produce no savings but in fact increase risk. Since South Africa has an 
abundance of smaller projects which potentially could be combined, this is an 
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important issue to consider and further research is required. More assistance 
should be given to small scale projects to overcome these barriers to entry. In 
addition, technology transfer is a critical factor, so should this not occur, it would 
impact the success and sustainability of projects. EIA regulations in South Africa 
are particularly stringent, and cause significant delays especially for smaller 
projects, which potentially don’t need such detailed assessments. Some of the 
interviewees have suggested that not all projects should have to undergo full 
EIAs. In comparison with international literature, the barriers and benefits in 
South Africa concur with international ones (although there have been some 
differences). Strangely enough, they seem not to have changed dramatically over 
time, but there have been many innovative suggestions for improvement, which 
may be well worth further study and research in the future. 
 
Therefore, finally, the research from interviews in South Africa has indicated that 
the key constraints (which is highlighted in Chapter Three (Table 6)) would be: 
 
• Complicated CDM process (5 respondents) 
• Resource and time intensive CDM process (9 respondents) 
• Limited methodologies with large risks and costs (6 respondents) 
• Complex baselines (3 respondents) 
• Additionality difficult to determine (5 respondents) 
• Long sales cycle (5 respondents) 
• EIAs rigorous and lengthy (5 respondents) 
• Lack of upfront funding and cash flow (6 respondents) 
• Large companies slow to adopt CDM opportunities (4 respondents) 
• Regulatory and compliance issues (8 respondents) 
• Uncertainty post 2012 (7 respondents) 
• High transaction costs (4 respondents) 
• CDM Executive Board takes too long (4 respondents) 
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The key suggestions for improvements from Table 6 would be: 
• Awareness of CDM to be improved (3 respondents) 
 
In summary, the top five constraints for CDM projects are resource and time 
intensive process, regulatory and compliance issues, uncertainty post 2012, lack 
of upfront funding and cash flow, and limited methodologies. Compared with the 
international literature, the barriers to CDM projects in South Africa are similar, 
but some deviations such as slow adoption of CDM by companies, inter-personal 
issues between stakeholders, and mismatch of opinion between scientists, 
academics and businessman have been noted. 
 
Future Trends and further recommendations for research 
 
As for future trends, the EU Commission has predicted, that based on current 
trends, more than half of the current member states could exceed their agreed 
share of allowed emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. The commission also 
anticipates that by 2010, the total GHG emissions would have increased by 1%, 
and carbon dioxide emissions would have increased by 4% as compared to the 
base year of 1990 (as apposed to an 8% reduction). Considering the penalty for 
non-compliance was set at $ 50 per ton carbon dioxide, or twice the market price 
for the pre-kyoto period (2005-2007), and $100 per ton carbon dioxide for 2008 
onwards, the consequences for non-compliance could be dire. In the light of 
these findings, emission trading could be fundamental to ensuring member states 
do comply with allocated emission targets (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003). 
 
Carbon taxes have been proposed, either as alternatives to emission trading, or 
to form part of a hybrid mechanism (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004). Several 
European countries have implemented either carbon taxes or energy taxes to 
reduce carbon emissions. The criticism of carbon taxes is that it could impact 
competitiveness and distribution of income. Other opponents of the carbon tax 
system feel that an emission trading mechanism allows policy makers to set fixed 
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targets for GHG abatement, at a lower cost, while a carbon tax could result in 
uncertain outputs and abatement costs (Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003). 
However the recommendation is that if it was used as a compliance mechanism, 
with the tax rates being higher than the emission-reduction credit price, it will 
operate more as an excess emissions tax, and dissuade polluting industries from 
doing so (Zhang and Baranzini, 2004).  
 
Increases in the costs of energy products, effectively creates an incentive to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while indirectly increasing the cost of other 
goods and services (Gupta and Bhandari, 1999). Hopefully this will initiate 
technological innovation to mitigate these higher costs, and instigate modification 
of consumer behavior. The additional revenue created through carbon/ energy 
taxes could be put to good use especially to offset any distributional issues 
(Gupta and Bhandari, 1999). 
 
Given the fact that developing countries might be allocated emission-reduction 
targets in 2012, it would be prudent to consider further research in this area. 
Some research has been done, which has proposed an emissions-trading budget 
for developing countries (Philibert, 2000). Many developing countries have 
rejected legally binding targets or limits as they fear it will constrain their 
economic growth. A few options have been proposed which hope to prevent 
excess “hot air” being traded – this is mostly because “hot air” allowances cost 
nothing and would be traded first. One of the options proposed is that as soon as 
a country with an emissions budget tries to sell credits or allowances, it is 
subjected to a real limit on its emissions (Philibert, 2000). Another option would 
be to establish two targets for a country – one binding and the other non-binding. 
The non-binding one would be instated at a lower level (in order to reduce hot 
air), while the binding one would be instated at a higher level (to prevent limiting 
economic growth). The developing country would be expected to buy allowances 
if its emissions were above the higher (binding target), and sell allowances if its 
emissions were below the lower (non-binding target). However this system could 
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be open to abuse, since the particular country could sell the budgeted 
allowances or credits above its non-binding target, but below its binding target 
without fear of penalty. This is obviously not the approved course of action, but it 
could occur, and the expectation is that countries would act in good faith. 
 
A third option is proposed whereby countries with emission budgets only trade at 
the end of the commitment period after the actual surplus has been verified. The 
detraction, is that one would not know if the credits for emission-reductions would 
be accepted and eventually traded. A fourth option requires buy back of 
allowances or credits sold should they bring about an excess in emissions. A “no-
regrets” option was postulated by the Centre for Clean Air Policy which stated 
that developing countries emission-reductions would not be capped, but allowed 
to rise provided that their GHG emissions grew at a rate below their economic 
growth. They were required to improve the “carbon efficiency” of their growth 
(Philibert, 2000). 
 
Another possibility for setting emission targets for developing countries is based 
on the “contraction and convergence” view, whereby emission rights are 
allocated or lead to a “convergence” of per capita levels. The premise of this view 
is that all humans are entitled to an equal share of a scarce common resource –
the global atmosphere. This is still a rather contentious issue, and further 
research and debate is required to resolve it. 
 
In conclusion, these constraints highlighted above are typical of findings 
described in the international literature and the research undertaken in South 
Africa corroborates this. Some deviations such as slow adoption of CDM by 
companies, inter-personal issues between stakeholders, and mismatch of 
opinion between scientists, academics and businessman have been noted. 
 
There is a growing viewpoint, that GHG emission targets could be set for 
companies or sectors through incentives and regulations within South Africa and 
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other developing countries. It is also possible that GHG mitigation could be 
required by law and so carbon trading could become an important practice for 
companies. As a consequence, companies could pre-emptively include costs of 
GHG mitigation in new projects, consider renewable energy and energy 
efficiency and develop new energy-efficient technologies. They could also set 
emission targets for themselves and monitor their performance against these 
targets, as well as construct carbon trading systems within their companies. 
 
Extensive business opportunities will emanate as demand for mitigation of 
climate impact, or more efficient use of ecosystem services, increases. Company 
endeavours should be advised by the best scientific evidence available. 
Businesses could use this to their competitive advantage and become market 
leaders and innovators in new burgeoning environmental markets. Many 
companies are now recognizing their collective responsibility to the social and 
environmental facets of sustainable development. Reputation and image is 
becoming increasingly important for companies in order to attract key staff and 
customers who prefer working for, or purchasing products from socially and 
environmentally-responsible companies. If ecosystem services can pay for 
themselves, through the economic benefits of carbon trading, and other similar 
mechanisms, the outcome will be extremely positive for all stakeholders, 
business and the environment. 
 
Finally, this study has attempted to highlight significant issues, with the view to 
improving the current knowledge and advance the possibility of solving or at least 
alleviating some of these burdening issues. Although the CDM and Carbon 
Trading is at the pioneering stage, there is an initiative to globally regulate 
Greenhouse gases for all developing and developed countries by 2012. It is 
therefore essential that we investigate as many issues around these activities as 
possible, as it is likely that CDM will play a major role in the future. 
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Appendix 1- Interviewee Details 
 
Interviewee 
Number 
Stakeholder Group Organization 
1 Trading, Financing Standard Bank 
2 Project Developer Bateman Africa 
3 Project and Economic Analyst Econ SA 
4 Financing Development Bank of  
South Africa 
5 Energy Consultant Nano Energy 
6 Project Developer Nu Planet Energy 
7 Project Developer Eskom 
8 Project Developer/ Advisor CDM Africa 
9 Project Developer AEL 
10 Project Developer Sappi 
11 DOE PWC 
12 Consultant/ Advisor PACE 
13 Consultant/ Advisor Imbewu 
14 Consultant/ Project developer CBLA 
15 Project Developer Palmer Development 
Group 
16 Project Developer/NGO SouthSouthNorth 
17 Research/ Consulting EDRC (Energy and 
Development 
Research Centre) 
18 Government Designated National 
Authority 
19 Project Developer Chemical and Allied 
Workers Association 
20 Project Developer SAB 
21 Research/ Project 
Developement 
University of Pretoria 
22 Environmentalist Ecocity 
23 Project developer Jones & Wagener 
consulting civil 
engineers 
24 Structuring Carbon 
Investment products/Trading 
Sterling Waterford 
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Appendix 2  Questionnaire for interviewees Carbon Trading and the Clean 
Development Mechanism in South Africa 
 
 Question: Answer: 
1 Name:  
2 Designation  
3 Telephone number  
4 Fax number  
5 Work address  
6 Email address  
7 What is your scope of work and degree 
of involvement in Carbon trading and 
CDM projects? 
 
 
8 What is your motivation for being 
involved in the above program? 
 
 
9 What role do you perform with regards to 
CDM development – (i.e. are you a 
project developer creating projects on 
behalf of specific industries/ or local 
authorities, or are you the actual owner 
of the potential emission credit within 
industry or local government). Do you 
perhaps perform another role? 
 
 
10 Do you have a CDM project registered, 
or alternatively at which stage is the 
registration process? 
 
 
11 What are the benefits and advantages of 
developing CDM projects? 
 
 
12 What are the constraints or bottlenecks 
around registering or developing CDM 
projects? What other concerns or issues 
do you have around these projects? 
 
 
14 Are these projects sustainable? Please 
could you elaborate a bit further on this. 
 
15 Do you have any suggestions that could 
improve or alleviate some of the 
concerns and constraints above? 
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Appendix 3  Technological options for mitigation of carbon dioxide and 
Sink Projects 
 
Technological options 
Some of the technological options would encompass more efficient conversion of 
fossil fuels (i.e. increasing power station efficiency from 30% to 60% and the use 
of cogeneration plants for separate generation of power and heat), switching to 
low carbon fossil fuels (i.e. combined gas turbine technology), decarbonisation of 
fuels and increasing use of renewable sources of energy (Sims et al., 2003). 
 
Intermittent renewable energy technologies such as wind, solar, tidal and wave 
energy may require storage of energy to ensure a constant flow of energy. 
Hydro-electricity is the most advanced, but is limited by societal and 
environmental barriers. The other constraint for hydro is that the remote location 
for hydro sites translates into high upfront costs. Wind power is a newer addition 
to the fold, but as a result of its intermittent supply of energy, it only supplies 
0.1% of global energy (Sims et al., 2003). In the future, many wind turbines will 
be situated off shore, will be more reliable, and be cheaper to operate. Solar 
radiation is a good idea, but the technology is still quite expensive, there are 
seasonal fluctuations and it is insufficient for large scale energy supply (Sims et 
al., 2003). 
 
Carbon sequestration includes biological sinks (discussed below), and physical 
sequestration i.e. capture and storage of carbon dioxide in underground 
reservoirs (oil, gas or deep saline ones), or storage in the deep ocean. Other 
options include capture from fuel gas before combustion, or after combustion 
using amine solvents (Sims et al., 2003). New capture techniques involve 
cryogenics, membranes and adsorption. As with all physical and biological 
techniques, the permanency of storage, retention time and verification becomes 
complex. 
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Biomass is widely available, and could provide poorer communities with a 
constant supply of renewable energy. It includes waste from agriculture and 
forestry, landfill gas and municipal solid waste. There is a good financial and 
market potential for bagasse, rice husks, bark and sawdust since they have 
disposal costs, and the use of these products for energy dispenses of that need. 
 
Sink Projects 
An annex to existing modalities and procedures for sink projects was adopted at 
COP 9 in Milan. Sink projects that are acceptable are afforestation and 
deforestation. Afforestation is defined as the ”direct human induced conversion of 
land that has not been forested for a period of at least 50 years, into forested 
land through planting or seeding”. Reforestation in the first commitment period 
(2008- 2012) is defined as “land that did not contain forest on 31 December 
1989” (UNEP, 2004, 36). The modalities and procedures have provided some 
rules for sink projects to adhere to. The credits produced should not contribute 
more than 1% of 1990 emission levels. Additionally, other sinks such as 
revegetation, forest management, cropland management and grazing land 
management are not acceptable for CDM projects, but could be utilized for joint 
implementation projects (J1). The crediting period for sink projects is longer, and 
the benefits accumulate over longer periods. The crediting period begins at 
inception of the reforestation or afforestation activity and can last for either a 
maximum of 20 years (renewable twice, provided a DOE has used new data and 
the baseline is still valid), or alternatively a maximum of 30 years. 
 
The carbon stored in all the carbon pools must be accounted for.  Above ground 
biomass, dead wood, litter, below ground biomass and soil organic carbon are 
recognized as carbon pools (UNEP, 2004). As with normal CDM projects, the 
baseline and monitoring methodologies must be approved by the executive 
board. There are however some differences, in that the new methodologies 
should be based on “existing or historical changes in carbon stocks and carbon 
pools within the project boundary”, or “changes in carbon stocks within the 
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project boundary”. These are some of the approaches that should be adopted 
(UNEP, 2004). Importantly, the project description should contain the exact 
geographic location, details on carbon pools selected, current environmental 
status, the legal title of the land, land tenure and right of access. Community and 
social involvement is required and environmental impacts should be done. Since 
carbon stores can fluctuate with time, timeous monitoring and verification of data 
should be carefully considered. Sinks are inherently temporary, and the carbon 
stored in them is susceptible to losses owing to fires, disease and pests. In 
accordance with this, different approaches for crediting can be followed, either to 
select temporary credits (tCERs) which expire at the end of the commitment 
period or long term credits (lCERs) which expire at the end of the crediting 
period. Verification for both could take place every 5 years (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Given the temporary nature of these credits, some controversy has surrounded 
implementation of these projects, while there is also concern that possible social 
and institutional restrictions imposed through the negotiation process might 
complicate matters further (Forner and Jotzo, 2002). The quality of sink projects 
has been raised by critics as well as the fact that they may not meet the 
sustainable development objectives of the CDM. Other issues include technical 
difficulties in baseline setting, additionality, monitoring, leakage, and verifiability. 
In addition, displacement of non-sink projects could become a barrier to 
technology transfer (Forner and Jotzo, 2002).  
 
Small scale CDM sink projects have slighter more flexibility, in that avoided 
deforestation is acceptable as long as it can be proven that the technology (i.e. 
efficient woodstoves) would minimize the deforestation.  On the other hand small 
scale CDM projects are restricted to less than 8 ktCO2/ year greenhouse gas 
removal, and the projects must be formulated and managed by low income 
communities. 
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Appendix 4  Other Players in the Carbon Market 
 
Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) 
This fund is a partnership of approximately six governments and seventeen 
private sector companies and has ventured into the project-based mechanism of 
the carbon market in order to generate credits for reduction in greenhouse gases. 
It has been the leader in the creation of the carbon market, utilizing the CDM and 
JI to assist and facilitate developed countries achieve their emission-reduction 
targets (PCF, 2004). In 2004, it was preparing 32 projects with an emission-
reduction potential of 165 Million USD. It diversifies its selection of projects based 
on technological and geographical factors. Renewable energy and waste to 
energy technologies have been in the majority, and geographically there is 
currently more of a balance ranging from Latin America to East Asia (PCF, 
2004). It has three main objectives: To demonstrate how project-based 
mechanisms can contribute to sustainable development and reduce compliance 
costs; through the development of policies, rules and business processes, teach 
interested parties how to learn by doing; show how partnerships with government 
and private companies can address climate change issues (Kessels, 2001). 
 
The PCF has in fact contributed greatly to development of CDM methodologies 
as well as sharing its experiences, issues, solutions and lessons learnt with all 
parties in the UNFCCC. It has submitted many baseline methodologies 
especially on waste management and renewable energy projects and regularly 
commented on draft papers and issues prepared by the methodology panel. The 
PCF has mostly purchased Verified Emission-reductions (where the purchaser 
assumes most of the Kyoto related risk), as apposed to Certified Emission-
reductions, where the project sponsor assumes the Kyoto related risk. In order to 
mitigate the risk of non delivery of Verified Emission-reductions, the PCF has 
embarked on a rigorous process of project screening, transaction structuring, 
portfolio risk management and monitoring (PCF, 2004).  
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According to the PCF many fundamental decisions on methodologies still need to 
be made since CDM projects are still exposed to regulatory risk. They believe its 
not clear how national and sectoral policies will be consulted when assessing 
baseline methodologies. Also they are not clear on how additionality will applied 
and what will transpire when economic justifications or baselines have changed. 
Other issues they are concerned about are how small scale projects will operate 
in the waste management sector, how simplified methodologies would be applied 
to very small projects and methodologies for afforestation and deforestation 
(PCF, 2004).  
 
Dutch ERUPT 
The Dutch Carbon purchasing program (ERUPT – Emissions Reduction Unit 
Procurement Tender) is part of the Dutch government’s commitment to invest 
about US$ 600 million through a series of GHG mitigation programs and 
initiatives. It is a scheme where carbon credits are purchased by public tenders. 
The requirements include host country approval, accurate and validated 
baselines, as well as the project being feasible. Projects such as renewable 
energy, fuel switching (oil to gas, coal to gas), energy efficiency, forestry and 
waste to energy are eligible projects. 
In 2002, 36 Million Euro was spent on a tender for central and Eastern Europe 
and approximately 8 Euro/ t CO2 was paid. Two additional tenders were supplied 
in 2002 for clean energy projects (under CDM), and mini energy projects for on 
and off-grid wind, solar, mini Hydro and geothermal energy (Ecosecurities, 2002). 
 
UK emission trading scheme 
The UK has a voluntary trading scheme, which has operated since March 2002. 
The incentive for companies to join, was to receive an 80% discount on the 
climate change levy which is a local UK tax on industrial and commercial energy 
consumption. In order to benefit from this discount, industry is expected to accept 
an absolute or rate-based limitation on either their greenhouse gas emissions or 
 115 
their energy consumption. Depending on which option they select, this will 
determine which rules and regulations affect their participation in the market, and 
when they will receive their allocation of allowances from the government (IETA, 
2005). 
 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
The Chicago Climate Exchange is a pilot cap and trade system for greenhouse 
gases. In this trading scheme, companies volunteered to reduce their emissions 
from 2003 to 2006. They could either reduce their emissions from internal 
projects, purchase allowances from other companies, or from external projects 
(IETA, 2005). 
 
The New South Wales GHG Abatement scheme 
This scheme began in January 2003, and is valid until 2012. It requires GHG 
benchmarks to be applied to all electricity retailers and other parties. Based on 
this benchmark, all involved parties are expected to reduce their GHG emissions 
to that level, and any excess would require surrender of abatement certificates 
(which have previously been allocated to the respective companies). At the end 
of the compliance year, any excess emissions that have not been covered by 
these abatement certificates (called a greenhouse shortfall) are penalized (IETA, 
2005). 
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Appendix 5  Carbon revenue for projects 
Carbon revenue for projects 
In order to calculate the carbon revenue, that each project will generate, the 
following formula is used: 
Carbon revenue($/yr)= carbon credits(tonnes/yr) X carbon price($/tonne) 
And the carbon credits are calculated by: 
Carbon credits = Baseline emissions – Actual emissions 
Other greenhouse gases are converted into carbon dioxide equivalence, in order 
to use these formulas (EDRC, 2002). 
Two indicators are important for the viability of a CDM project – these are net 
present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR). The net present value is 
the present value of cash flows, the costs, and revenues throughout the project 
lifetime (EDRC, 2002). The net present value effectively represents the total 
financial value created by the project, while the cash flows demonstrate the 
revenues and costs for that year. The net present value (NPV) must be positive 
for the project to be attractive to the investor. The discount rate represents the 
time value of money (money is worth more now than in the future).The internal 
rate of return (IRR) is the discount rate that makes the net present value = 0. This 
means that when the net present value (NPV) is zero, the discount rate is equal 
to the internal rate of return (IRR). Formulas are used to calculate all of the 
above: 
PV=Vn/ (1+r)n 
PV = present value of costs 
r= discount rate 
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n=number of years 
Vn= value in year n 
and 
NPV= (PV( annual cash flow))  
( i.e. the sum of all cash flows over the lifetime of the project) 
These may seem complicated, but in essence, it means that if the internal rate of 
return ( IRR) is positive, then the project is going to be profitable (EDRC, 2002) 
(IETA, 2004). 
Some critics have indicated that use of the above mechanisms (IRR and NPV) to 
demonstrate additionality of a project can be subject to manipulation. They feel 
that financial calculations can be presented differently, depending on the investor 
and a false sense of objectivity is given (Lehmann, 2004). 
Both CDM and JI projects are likely to incur considerable transaction costs owing 
to the fact that multiple approval steps are required (Fichtner et al., 2003). Costs 
of project development and costs of dealing with government representatives are 
noteworthy. Two categories of transaction costs have been defined such as costs 
of undertaking projects in foreign countries, and costs for attaining CDM credits. 
The sum of both, being the total project transaction costs. Further to that, specific 
costs have been illuminated in a formula below: 
Specific cost =  
(production cost + transaction cost)/ Amount of emissions reduced 
Other studies indicate that transaction costs can account for about 20% of total 
project costs, and even as much as 50%. Certainly the research shows that the 
component of transaction costs in production costs (costs of investment into 
technical systems) is higher than expected. Also, from analysis of the samples 
taken, they found that total project transaction costs could account for 6-53% of 
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total project costs (Fichtner et al., 2003). Further analysis indicates that technical 
assistance could account for 50% of transaction costs, administration 36%, follow 
up 12% and reporting costs 2%. When considering reducing of transaction costs, 
technical assistance and administration costs seem a good place to start. 
Economies of scale are also important since it is well known that transaction 
costs, in terms of costs per ton of carbon dioxide reduced, are cheaper in larger 
projects- this is mostly owing to the important role of fixed costs within the project 
(Michaelowa et al., 2003). Of total project costs, indirect costs relate to 
negotiation costs, consulting fees, insurance amongst other things. Indirect costs 
could amount to 40% of total project costs (Fichtner et al., 2003). 
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 Appendix 6  Market potential of CDM credits and typical transaction costs 
CDM projects can realize revenues from the normal project cycle, as well as 
carbon credits, but in addition have extra transaction costs associated with 
design of the project document, approval, and then costs associated with each 
step within the CDM project cycle (EDRC, 2002). There are mechanisms to 
reduce these costs, discussed later, but all of the above costs must be taken into 
account when embarking on these types of projects. Some experts believe that 
registration, monitoring and verification costs could be as much as 5-10% of the 
project budget (EDRC, 2002). It is important to note that the value of the carbon 
credits, overall transaction costs (see Table 7 and 8 for typical CDM transaction 
costs), and upfront transaction costs can affect project viability (UNEP, 2004). It 
is also widely believed that approximately 5 to 7% of the net present value of 
revenue can be expected to finance upfront transaction costs, while 10 to 12% of 
net present value of revenue would finance total transaction costs. Previous 
studies and carbon market models indicate that transaction costs can range 
between 0.25 $US/t C02 and 4.00 $US/t CO2 (Krey, 2005). However, based on 
research of transaction costs of CDM projects in India, they do not seem to be 
unacceptably high (Krey, 2005). 
Pricing of carbon credits is set by market forces, and depending on whether this 
project is a CDM or J1 Project, will determine the price. Issues such as project 
risks, political stability, sustainable development criteria, technology type and 
transaction costs would affect the viability of the project, as well as the tradable 
price. The prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) considers issues such as government 
guarantees, delivery of social benefits and transaction costs as part of 
preparation for the project, while the Dutch Government consider technology type 
when pricing carbon credits. Market prices are also affected by interactions and 
dynamics of supply and demand. Traders evaluate factors such as level of 
demand by investors, and the ability of the Executive Board to process and 
approve CDM projects. 
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Other issues under consideration are speculation on possible tightening of 
regulations, innovation of new technologies and volume and schedules of large 
government purchases (Natsource, 2004). The forecast price is approximately 4 
USD -11 USD per ton of carbon dioxide, and also depends on when the credits 
fall due – i.e. earlier credits are cheaper than ones that fall due during the period 
(2008-2012) (UNEP, 2004). Many predictive models have suggested that the 
price would probably be below 10 USD per ton of carbon dioxide (Springer and 
Varilek, 2004). Holding of CERs by non-Annex 1 parties would both increase the 
price and total number of CERs, although some models have predicted that 
holding of 10% of CERs by non-Annex 1 countries could cause less than 
1US$/tC price increase, but a 10MtC fall in the CERs issued to Annex 1 parties 
owing to domestic reduction actions and JI projects (Chen, 2003). If this does in 
fact occur, it would be an interesting research exercise to pursue as more CDM 
projects develop. 
It should be noted that Renewable energy projects, can fetch higher prices and 
are used as the reference price. Biomass and Energy-efficient projects are priced 
approximately 20% lower, while fuel switching and Methane projects are usually 
priced 40% lower than renewable energy projects. However, owing to the fact 
that methane has a global warming potential of 21 times that of Carbon Dioxide, 
and can therefore generate more credits (albeit at a lower price), methane 
capture projects are more enticing to project developers (UNEP, 2004; IETA, 
2004). Residential and commercial energy-efficient projects, owing to the above 
would require many participants to ensure sufficient emission-reductions, and 
sometimes generate less emissions than would be expected. As a consequence, 
the administrative costs could be higher owing to particular institutional 
requirements (IETA, 2004). Since energy-efficient measures are frequently cost 
effective, they may have happened anyway, and it may be difficult to prove 
additionality. 
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An interesting piece of research has illuminated the issue of displacement of 
renewable energy projects to beyond EU borders. From the research done, it 
was proposed that it would be cheaper for European power companies to deploy 
renewable energy projects through the CDM and JI mechanism, than within the 
EU borders. A complication of this would be that some of the benefits of 
renewable energy would not be available to the EU locally (de Rio Gonzalez et 
al., 2005). 
Mechanisms of reducing costs 
There are standardised approval processes and procedures (especially relating 
to whether projects conform to sustainable development criteria), which could 
reduce planning, search costs, uncertainty and even costs of administration. 
Standardised methods for setting baselines, standard emission factors and other 
predetermined values would be useful for reducing transaction costs (Fichter et 
al., 2003). Other suggestions would be to do verification and certification at 
longer intervals (as apposed to annually), embark on unilateral CDM projects that 
reduce search and negotiation costs, standardise the information required for 
each step of the cycle, provide smaller projects with exemptions (i.e. bundling 
projects , reduction of certain required steps, smaller fees from the executive 
board). Mini and Micro projects should receive even more assistance (projects 
below 1000 tCO2) (Michaelowa et al., 2003). Some of the typical CDM costs are 
depicted in the table below, while the following table provides estimates of 
specific CDM project tasks. 
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Table 7: CDM Transaction costs (After UNEP, 2004) 
 
Search Costs   Costs incurred by investors and hosts as they seek out 
partners for mutually advantageous projects  
Negotiation 
costs 
Includes those costs incurred in the preparation of the project 
design document. This process also documents assignment 
and scheduling of benefits over the project time period. It also 
includes the expenses in organizing public consultation with 
key stakeholders 
Baseline 
determination 
Development of a baseline 
Approval costs Costs of authorization from host country 
Validation 
costs 
Costs incurred in reviewing and revising the project design 
document by operational entity 
Review costs Costs of reviewing a validation document 
Pre-
operational 
phase design 
Registration 
costs 
Registration by UNFCCC Executive Board/J1 Supervisory 
committee 
Monitoring 
costs 
Costs to collect data 
Verification 
costs 
Costs to hire an operational entity and to report to the 
UNFCCC Executive Board/ Supervisory committee 
Review costs Costs of reviewing a verification 
Certification 
costs 
Includes costs in the issuance of Certified Emission-reduction 
units (ERUs for J1) by UNFCCC Executive Board 
Operational 
phaze 
Enforcement 
costs 
Includes administrative and legal costs incurred in enforcing 
transaction agreements 
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Transfer costs Brokerage costs Trading 
Registration 
costs 
Costs to hold an account in national registry 
Transaction costs are those that are a result of initiating and completing 
transactions to secure CERs. They are comprised of pre-operational costs (or 
upfront costs), implementation costs (costs spread out over the entire crediting 
period), and trading costs. Pre-operational costs involve direct expenses for 
search, negotiation, validation and approval. Implementation costs are those 
incurred for monitoring, certification and enforcement, while trading costs refer to 
brokerage costs, and costs to hold an account in a national registry. In table 8 
below, The Prototype Carbon fund suggest that the pre-operational transaction 
costs could be as much as 229 thousand euros (265 thousand USD), while 
Ecosecurities believe that the pre-operational transaction costs could be about 
70 thousand euros(42 000 pounds) (UNEP, 2004).  
 
Table 8: CDM Transaction Cost Estimates (after UNEP, 2004) 
 
CDM Transaction Costs Estimates Ecosecurities 
Estimates 
( Pounds) 
PCF Estimates 
( USD) 
Preparation and Review ...  40 000.00 
Baseline Study  12 000.00 – 15 
000.00 
 20 000.00 
Monitoring Plan  5000.00 – 10 000.00  20 000.00 
Environmental Assessment     
Stakeholder consultation     
Approval   
Validation 10 000.00 – 20 
000.00 
30 000.00 
Consultation and project Appraisal  105 000.00 
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CDM Transaction Costs Estimates Ecosecurities 
Estimates 
( Pounds) 
PCF Estimates 
( USD) 
Legal and Contractual arrangements 15 000.00- 25 000.00 50 000.00 
Sales of CERs  5%-15% of CER 
value 
  
Adaptation Levy  2% of CER value 
Annually 
  
Risk Mitigation  1%-3% of CER value 
annually 
  
Verification  5000.00 per audit  25 000.00 ( 
initial) 
10 000.00- 25 
000.00 
 
Executive Board Administration     
 
 
In Summary, the financial inflows from the sale of the CERs must exceed the 
transaction costs and the costs of emission-reductions to be a viable project 
(IETA, 2004). The higher the transaction costs, the fewer projects will be 
economically acceptable, and therefore not even enter the CDM project pipeline. 
Some experts believe projects classified as large (wind power, energy efficiency, 
solar and thermal -20 000 to 200 000 tCO2e/year) or very large (Large hydro, 
gas power, landfill methane capture, large scale afforestation and geothermal –
over 200 000 tCO2e/year) would be financially successful (IETA, 2004). From 
their research, it appears that production costs and transaction costs are 
minimized in larger projects. Even though a large part of the transaction costs are 
fixed, the simplified modalities and procedures for small scale projects (see 
above), have lowered the transaction costs for them.  
 
The market potential for emission-reductions in 2010 is approximately 400 
MtCO2e, and this necessitates an annual investment of about 10 Billion USD. If 
one combines the minimum demand by industry and government the potential 
demand for CERs (CDM) and ERUs (J1), could be about 100 MtCO2e (IETA, 
2004). “Carbon credits can contribute approximately 5-10% of the capital costs of 
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clean energy projects” (Ecosecurities, no date, 14). Other research done by the 
OECD indicates that CDM projects could generate approximately 32 Million tons 
of CO2-eq/ year during the first commitment period (2008-2012) (OECD, 2004). 
They also suggest that the increase in energy related carbon dioxide emissions 
between 1990 and 2010 could reach 7.4 billion tons. Of this amount, non-Annex 
1 countries are expected to produce the majority (5.2 billion tons or 70%) based 
on a business as usual scenario. In 2010, total energy related emissions are 
projected to be 27.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide. Emissions from non- OECD 
countries are predicted to rise, from 45% in 2000 to 57% in 2030, while in China 
the expected emissions increase are particularly concerning – doubling from 3.1 
to 6.7 billion tons over the same period. In addition, the energy sector is expected 
to need an investment of 16 trillion dollars by 2030, in order to satisfy the ever 
increasing need for energy goods and services (OECD, 2004). 
 
Project activity is distributed currently more around Latin America, possibly owing 
to more foreign direct investment, while other areas have far less activity. Asia, 
and especially China could be a huge market for CDM projects (IETA, 2004). 
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Table 9: Examples of impact of CERs on project IRR (after UNEP, 2002) 
 
Country Project IRR without 
Carbon Finance 
(%) 
IRR with Carbon 
Finance (%) 
Costa Rica Wind power 9.7 10.6 
Jamaica Wind Power 17.0 18.0 
Morocco Wind Power 12.7 14.0 
Chile Hydro 9.2 10.4 
Costa Rica Hydro 7.1 9.7 
Guyana Bagasse 7.2 7.7 
Brazil Biomass 8.3 13.5 
India Solid Waste 13.8 18.7 
    
From the above Table 9 it can be seen that Biomass and Solid waste projects 
benefit the most from additional carbon finance – i.e. carbon credits, with a larger 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and hence greater profitability. 
 
There are other factors which can affect prices. The greater the guarantee that 
can be provided regarding the delivery of validated, verified and certified CERs 
within the stipulated timeframe and according to the agreed quantity, the higher 
the price will be (IETA, 2005). Issues such as the experience of the project 
developer and creditworthiness of the sponsor will affect the viability of the 
project. Forward contracts (upfront purchases before credits are delivered) for 
CERs are cheaper than spot contracts (purchases for actual credits being 
delivered). If an upfront payment is negotiated, then discount rates often apply, 
and in most contracts the seller also incurs liability should the project fail to 
deliver (IETA, 2005). All of these above factors can affect the final CER price.  
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Appendix 7  Small Scale projects and mechanisms of reducing costs 
 
In the case of small scale projects (see Table 10 for examples of these), simpler 
requirements have been established for cost reduction. The following projects 
would comply: 
 
Type 1 – small renewable energy activities up to 15 Megawatts (or equivalent) 
Type 11 – small energy efficiency improvements which reduce energy 
consumption by up to 15 gigawatt hours per year 
Type 111- other project activities that both reduce emissions caused by human 
activities and produce less than 15 Kilotonnes of carbon dioxide (or equivalent for 
other gases) annually. 
 
Table 10: The Executive Board’s current version of small-scale CDM project 
activity (after UNEP, 2004) 
 
Project Types Small scale CDM project Activity 
categories 
Type 1: Renewable energy projects  A. Electricity Generation by the 
user 
B. Mechanical energy for the user 
C. Thermal energy for the user 
D. Renewable electricity generation 
for a grid  
Type 11: Energy efficiency 
improvement projects  
A. Supply side efficiency 
improvements- transmission and 
distribution 
B. Supply side energy-efficient  
improvements – generation 
C. Demand side energy efficiency 
programs for specific 
technologies 
D. Energy efficiency and fuel 
switching measures for industrial 
facilities 
E. Energy efficiency and fuel 
switching measures for buildings 
Type 111:Other project activities A. Agriculture 
B. Switching fossil fuels 
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Project Types Small scale CDM project Activity 
categories 
Type 1: Renewable energy projects  A. Electricity Generation by the 
user 
B. Mechanical energy for the user 
C. Thermal energy for the user 
D. Renewable electricity generation 
for a grid  
C. Emission-reductions by low 
greenhouse gas emission 
vehicles 
D. Methane recovery 
E. Methane avoidance 
Types 1-111 Other small scale projects 
 
From the above table it can be seen that sink projects, do not qualify for small 
scale projects, and that these categories are mutually exclusive, in that projects 
can only qualify for one , or another, but not for all three. If the project consists of 
both renewable and non-renewable components then the 15MW limit only 
applies to the renewable component (UNEP, 2004) 
 
Developers of small-scale CDM projects can propose additional categories, for 
projects, especially if the project does not belong to any of the existing 
categories. These can be sent directly to the Executive Board without going 
through a DOE. A description of how a simplified baseline and monitoring 
methodology could be applied to the new project category, must be supplied. If 
accepted by the Executive Board, this new category will be appended to the 
small-scale modalities and procedures, and this category can be used.  
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Figure 9: Percentage of projects that fall under the definitions of small 
scale (after Ecosecurities CDM: Simplified Modalities and Procedures for 
Small –Scale Projects, 2002, 35) 
 
From Figure 9, one can clearly see that of approximately 268 renewable energy 
projects, 187 fell into the small scale category. A similar pattern was seen for 
energy efficiency and other projects. (Most small scale projects are 5MW.GWh or 
Kilotonnes of carbon dioxide). 
 
Small project activities can be bundled (in order to reduce costs), or grouped 
together so that key aspects of CDM rules such as design, registration and 
verification can be addressed for the whole bundle rather than the individual 
projects. Also the following cost-reducing mechanisms would apply to small scale 
projects: simpler requirements for the project design document; simpler 
methodologies for developing the project baseline; simpler requirements for 
monitoring emissions; lastly, a single 3rd party verifier may undertake validation, 
verification and certification of small projects to reduce costs (CDMguide.net, 
2005). 
 
 130 
Furthermore the CDM executive board may lower admin fees charged to small 
projects. According to UNEP (2004, 45), the registration costs would be 5000.00 
USD (small scale projects) as apposed to 30 000.00 USD (normal CDM 
projects). Small-scale project activities submitted as a bundle, can submit a 
single project design document as long as the participants and location of 
activities are described for each project, and an overall monitoring plan is 
provided (separate monitoring plans can be provided if so desired).The proviso 
here is that projects can be bundled as long as the total size is below the limits 
for a single project. Small-scale projects cannot be debundled components of a 
larger project. This is easily verified by checking to see if there is another small-
scale project registered, or an application to register a project that has the same 
participants, falls in the same category, has been registered in the previous two 
years,  or whose boundary is within 1km of the proposed small-scale activity 
(UNEP, 2004). In addition validation of the activities can be carried out for all the 
projects together, while verification and certification can be carried out against 
this overall monitoring plan. Standardized baselines have been proposed for 
some of the project categories in order to simplify the procedures, and leakage 
calculations are not necessary unless the project utilizes equipment from another 
site. Further to that, when monitoring small-scale projects, relatively small 
samples which are reflective of the devices installed i.e. energy saving lamps, 
need to be taken (UNEP, 2004). 
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Appendix 8  Buyers and Sellers of project-based credits 
 
Buyers of Project-based credits 
 
Annex 1 (or B) countries have legally binding targets, and are therefore obliged 
to meet their commitments through domestic emission-reductions (approximately 
50%) (UNEP, 2004), while the rest could come from purchasing emission-
reductions. Governments and industry are the prime candidates for purchasing 
project-based emission-reductions, and from the research done until April 2005, 
most of the purchases have come from Europe. Of the European buyers, 75% of 
the purchases have come from industry, while only 25% has been from 
governments (In particular the Dutch, Danish, Swedish and Austrian) (IETA, 
2005). Governments have been conspicuously slower in purchasing, but perhaps 
that has been owing to budgeting cycles, regulatory uncertainty and that 
inevitably larger volumes are sought (IETA, 2005). 
 
2.10  Sellers of project-based credits 
 
As of April 2005, the largest seller of emission-reduction credits has been Asia 
(Approximately 45%), with Latin America second (approximately 35%). A large 
number of projects have been approved by the Indian DNA, but since these are 
unilateral CDM projects (no Annex B/1 buyer identified yet), they do not reflect as 
credits sold yet (IETA, 2005). In Figure 3, a graphical depiction of the projects 
which have been validated and registered with the CDM Executive Board, it can 
be seen that the three largest suppliers of projects are India, Brazil and Chile 
while Africa has been lagging. This picture has changed somewhat in that South 
Africa and Uganda have recently registered a few CDM projects, with Nigeria, 
Ghana, Sierra Leone and Zambia actively working on some. In South Africa, 
local businesses such as SAB and Anglo American have embarked on unilateral 
CDM projects. The intention appears to be to use these to offset their emission 
targets in Europe, or to sell the credits to market buyers (Africainvestor, 2005). 
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China and Mexico are emerging markets and have a large number of projects in 
the pipeline (IETA, 2005). China and India are expected to account for 60% of 
the CDM market share (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). 
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Appendix 9  Enforcement Mechanisms for non compliant countries 
 
There is a risk of non-compliance so the design of enforcement mechanisms, (in 
the event of non compliant countries), was agreed at COP7 by the parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Two bodies were created to ensure implementation of these 
mechanisms – a Facilitative branch and an Enforcement branch. The Facilitative 
branch’s tasks and duties are to consult, and advise the parties to the protocol, 
while the Enforcement branch is tasked with deciding if a country is in 
compliance. Each branch must be composed of 10 members elected from the 
conference of the parties. One representative from each of the five UN regions, 
one from the small island developing states and two from Annex 1 and non-
Annex 1 parties should be represented within each branch. A three quarters 
majority is required to ratify decisions from the facilitative branch, as apposed to 
a three quarters majority, and a double majority of both Annex 1 and non-Annex 
1 parties for the Enforcement branch. Sanctions are automatically applied if a 
party has not complied. They include deducting a number of tonnes equal to 1.3 
times the amount in excess emissions from the parties assigned amount, for the 
second commitment period, a compliance action plan has to be developed by the 
non compliant party, and its eligibility to sell permits is suspended (Hagem et al., 
2005). 
 
Should a non compliant country (that is a net buyer of permits) withdraw from the 
agreement, after being penalized with sanctions, the international permit price 
could fall. Conversely, if it chose to completely comply with its commitments and 
applied sanctions, the permit price could increase. A further effect could be that 
should a certain country withdraw after sanctions, it could trigger other countries 
to do so as well. Future research is required in this area, since it may have an 
important impact on the success of the emission trading system (Hagem et al., 
2005). 
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Appendix 10  Institutions that have contributed to the development of CDM 
 
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol are empowered to define, develop, review and 
implement the rules of the CDM. Delegates from each country represented, meet 
to make decisions regarding the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM. This meeting is 
known as the Conference of the Parties (COP), which serves as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the protocol (MOP) (CDMguide.net, 2005). The COP/ MOP has 
ultimate control over the CDM, and therefore provides guidance to the CDM 
Executive Board on the rules of the CDM, rules of procedure and the 
accreditation of designated operational entities (DOE). In essence, they perform 
an overall governing function. Some of the tasks and duties of COP/ MOP would 
be to review the annual report from the CDM Executive Board, review regional 
distribution of the designated operational entities, facilitate accreditation of these 
entities, monitor distribution of project activities to identify constraints to their 
development, and even arrange funding where possible for these projects.  
 
The CDM Executive Board supervises the day to day operations of the CDM. 
The Executive Board consists of ten members drawn from developing and 
developed countries. One representative from each of the five UN regions 
(Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Eastern Europe and 
OECD), one from the small island developing states and two from Annex 1 and 
non-Annex 1 states each, are expected to participate. The UN pays for the costs 
of participation of all members, including alternate members. The powers of the 
Executive Board range from rejection of registration of CDM projects to denying 
CDM project credits. In addition it checks to see if projects conform to the CDM 
rules as well as deciding how projects are managed and regulated. Another 
critical function of the Executive Board is to develope guidelines for baseline 
methodologies, advise the COP/MOP on new modalities, procedures and 
guidelines, and approve new methodologies for baselines, monitoring plans and 
project boundaries (Wilder, 2004). It considers and evaluates validation and 
certification decisions taken by Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) and 
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adjudicates those actions. These Designated Operational Entities act as 
independent auditors who validate the prospective CDM projects, verify the 
emission-reductions and certify them as Certified Emission-reductions. The 
Executive Board can also suspend designated operational entities that no longer 
conform to the accreditation standards or CDM rules (CDMguide.net, 2005). 
 
Other tasks and duties of the CDM Executive Board include the construction of 
new policies for the functioning of small scale CDM activities, especially 
simplified modalities and procedures. It performs administrative duties as well, in 
that it is expected to maintain a public list of accredited Designated Operational 
Entities, a database of CDM project activities as well as description of approved 
rules, procedures, methodologies and standards. The CDM registry, which keeps 
track of all the Certified Emission-reductions, ensures that issuance, holding, 
transfer and acquisition of CDM credits is correctly accounted for. Its structure 
and design should allow for accurate, transparent and efficient exchange of data 
between national registries, the CDM registry and an independent transaction 
log. Separate accounts for each project participant will be held, and track is kept 
of which stages the projects are currently in. Serial numbers are assigned to 
each credit to ensure accurate data is kept, and each credit will only be held in 
one account, in one registry at any given time. The registry administrator, upon 
instruction from the Executive Board, will issue the exact quantity of credits into a 
pending account, while withholding approximately 2% (of the value of the credits) 
for adaptation and administration expenses. The remaining credits will be 
deposited into the registry accounts of the project participants and other 
stakeholders, if necessary. Information which is not confidential is made available 
to the public (CDMguide.net, 2005; UNEP, 2004). 
 
Some of the criticisms lodged against the Executive Board have related to their 
level of bureaucracy and risk-averse attitude. It appears as if they have dragged 
their heels in approving certain baseline and monitoring methodologies 
(Lehmann and Telnes, 2004). This may have a lot to do with a lack of capacity 
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but it has compounded the problem of an already negative perception amongst 
companies with potential CDM projects (Emsley, 2004). The view is that an 
inflexible, unclear, and pedantic additionality process has complicated matters 
further resulting in high transaction costs without the guarantee that the project 
will be deemed additional (Emsley, 2004; Lehmann, 2004). A possible solution, is 
that the Executive Board has developed an additionality tool, which is intended to 
provide an objective assessment of the project. However, it is not perfect as yet 
(Lehmann, 2004).  
 
Designated operational entities (DOE) 
These Operational Entities are appointed by the CDM Executive Board and are 
typically private auditing and accounting companies or consulting and law firms 
which are accredited and capable of performing independent audits of emission-
reductions. Each of these entities need to apply for accreditation, and while they 
are undergoing this process, they are called Applicant Entities (AE) and are listed 
on the UNFCCC website. They can be accredited for 15 sectoral scopes (UNEP, 
2004), which is listed in the table below.  A CDM assessment team which has 
been assigned by the CDM assessment Panel will carry out the review of the 
Applicant Entity to decide if it has the applicable qualifications to become a DOE. 
If successful, the Applicant Entity will become a DOE and also be listed on the 
UNFCCC website.  
 
Both an Applicant Entity and DOE can propose new sectoral scopes (see Table 
11 for examples of this), as well as baseline and monitoring methodologies to the 
Executive Board. They must furnish the necessary procedural reports and 
documentary evidence for each new methodology submitted to the Executive 
Board for approval. (Any prospective project participant should select the 
appropriate scope under which their project best falls and choose a DOE who 
has been accredited for that scope). Once they have been accredited the DOE 
must validate CDM projects before they are submitted to the Executive Board for 
registration. Once the project is in operation, another independent DOE should 
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verify the emission estimates, check the projects documentation to ensure it 
conforms with the CDM rules, carry out on site inspections, assess monitoring 
results, verify that the monitoring methodologies have been followed without 
deviation, and formulate a verification report. Certification follows, which is the 
“written assurance that the project achieved the stated level of emission-
reductions” (CDMguide.net, 2005). 
 
Table 11: Sectoral Scopes for which AEs and DOEs can be accredited (after 
UNEP, 2004, 43) 
 
1 Energy Industries (renewable-/ non  renewable sources) 
2 Energy Distribution 
3 Energy Demand 
4 Manufacturing industries 
5 Chemical Industries 
6 Construction 
7 Transport 
8 Mining/ Mineral production 
9 Metal production 
10 Fugitive emissions from fuels( solid, oil and gas) 
11 Fugitive emissions from production and consumption of halocarbons and 
sulphur hexafluoride 
12 Solvents use 
13 Waste Handling and disposal 
14 Afforestation and reforestation 
15 Agriculture 
 
The general consensus is that the effectiveness of the DOE is often limited by 
lack of resources and time constraints. In South Africa there is only one 
accredited DOE (Price Waterhouse Coopers), and this corroborates the 
international view of limited resources and time available that DOEs have for 
validation and verification. 
 
The use of the above-mentioned additionality tool would be helpful to the DOE 
when evaluating projects however, they have not had faith until now, that the tool 
is 100% accurate.  Other factors such as investment, institutional and technology 
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barriers have been used to convince the Executive Board that the project would 
not have gone ahead without the CDM advantages (Lehmann, 2004). 
 
Designated National Authority (DNA) 
In order to participate in CDM projects, host countries must establish a 
designated national authority to develop national criteria for assessment and 
approval of projects and to ensure projects conform to national policy, regulations 
and to national development goals. The DNA should decide whether each project 
conforms to its sustainable development goals and if the country agrees to 
participate in the project (UNEP, 2002). To ensure that potential CDM investors 
elect to participate, host countries should design rapid, standardized, effective, 
transparent procedures to assess, screen, evaluate and approve projects. The 
regulatory framework and legal environment should be conducive to preparing 
and conducting projects in that particular country. This would include developing 
guidelines and procedures for project approval. In South Africa the Department of 
Mineral affairs and Energy (DME) are the designated national authority. 
 
Approvals and acceptance of projects have been notoriously slow and one of the 
suggestions has been to limit the number of project participants as listed on the 
PDD to the major parties, in order to speed up the process (Lehmann, 2004). 
Since in most cases, the DNA and project developers share common goals, it is 
quite apparent that DNAs worldwide have been very willing to assist project 
developers, and other interested stakeholders in developing CDM projects. 
 
NGOs 
These organizations can potentially fund and manage CDM projects, and their 
focus is often on sustainable development. Internationally the World Wildlife fund 
and the Nature Conservancy are very active, while in South Africa SouthSouth 
North are very involved in projects. 
 
Financial Institutions 
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Local commercial banks provide much of the bilateral funding, and in South 
Africa, the Development Bank of SA have been involved in project financing.  
 
Emission Brokers 
Their primary task is to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers. 
Forward contracts and Spot (immediate purchase) contracts are often facilitated 
by these brokers. 
 
Insurers 
The project owner may feel the need to mitigate some of the risk in case the 
project fails to deliver the contractually agreed number of carbon credits. In this 
case, the owner may purchase insurance cover from insurance companies. 
 
Project Owners 
The primary developer of the project, who formulates the project design 
document, is the project owner (EDRC, 2002). The owner is usually situated in 
the host country, and could be the host government, a private company, NGO or 
even a partnership of owners. Once the project owner has found an investor, 
(often in a developed country) they in turn could form a new partnership.  
 
Stakeholders 
While the DOE is conducting the validation, the project design document must be 
made available to the public. All stakeholders, including NGOs have a 30 day 
period to comment on the project design document.  Stakeholders would 
encompass anyone who is affected by the project, or who would participate in it 
(EDRC, 2002), After that, a detailed account of how comments from stakeholders 
were obtained, summaries of comments and a report on the above, should be 
provided to the Executive Board ( UNEP, 2004). Often capacity building is 
required especially if modification of community behaviour is required (EDRC, 
2002).  Even the process of doing Environmental Impact Assessments requires 
consultation with stakeholders. All stakeholders can also comment on validation 
 140 
reports at an international level and dispute registration of CDM projects. Host 
countries should consult with stakeholders, in order to prioritise sectors for CDM 
projects (Ecosecurities, 2002). Consequently if local communities and 
stakeholders support the project at inception, it is more likely to be successful 
and provide the expected credits and benefits. Some obstacles can occur when 
the project design document is placed on a web page, to which rural 
stakeholders have no access. Further to that, there are often language barriers 
where stakeholders are not able to understand the content of the document 
(UNEP, 2004). Also conflict can arise between stakeholders, if broad consultation 
has not taken place (Ecosecurities, 2002). 
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Appendix 11  Wits ethics committee application form and protocol 
 
HREC (2005) 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, JOHANNESBURG 
 
APPLICATION TO THE HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
(NON-MEDICAL) FOR CLEARANCE OF RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN SUBJECTS 
 
Unless applications are received by the 15th of the month, they will be carried forward to the 
following month for consideration.  Please note incomplete applications will NOT be considered at 
all. 
 
PROTOCOL NUMBER (for office use only): 
____________________________________ 
 
  
 This application must be typed or handwritten in capitals 
 
 NAME :Prof/Dr/Mr/Mrs/Ms/Miss Anne du Toit 
 DEPARTMENT/INSTITUTION Dept of Geography & 
Environmental Stud 
 FULL TIME OR PART-TIME Part time 
 TELEPHONE NO. AND EXTENSION  011 652 7439/ 083 458 8051 
 E-MAIL Anne.dutoit@Siemens.com 
 Name and Tel number of Supervisor Prof C Vogel - 011 717 6510 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT 
Carbon Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and the perceived benefits for 
South Africa 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
Is this research for degree purposes ? If so, for what degree, and has it been approved by the relevant 
higher degrees committee or other relevant unit? 
 
Research is for MSC – Higher degree committee has approved 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
WHERE WILL THE RESEARCH BE CARRIED OUT? 
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South Africa 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH (Please list) 
The aim and objective of the study is to identify the current implementation and 
effectiveness of the Clean Development Mechanism, as well as the possible 
opportunities and constraints. The intention is to improve the body of knowledge in 
order to mitigate these issues/ constraints that key stakeholders may be having and 
share best practices/ benefits in order to develop the market further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WHO ARE THE RESEARCHERS AND WHO WILL SUPERVISE THE PROJECT? 
 
Researcher – Anne du Toit 
Supervisor – Prof Coleen Vogel 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
Protocols submitted to the Committee must have the information that will enable it to judge the 
safety of procedures or confidentiality of information for research on participants. 
 
 
The following questions have been designed for this purpose and should therefore be answered as 
fully as possible. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
 
1. Give a brief outline of the proposed research including a definition of procedures 
 
The study will involve a literature survey and field research, through the use of a questionnaire. 
Where possible face to face interviews will be conducted, but in other cases the questionnaire will be 
emailed or faxed to participants. The Literature survey will include journal articles, books, World 
Wide Web articles as well as other articles published by climate change research consultants. Field 
research will involve one on one interviews and emailed questionnaires in order to gather the data. 
 
 
2. What type of information is to be gathered? Where a scale, questionnaire or interview 
schedule will be used, please attach a copy 
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A literature survey involves analysis and study of the last 5-8 years published journal articles. In 
particular, Climate Policy and Energy Policy journals will be reviewed, as well as Nature, Scientific 
American and IPCC reports amongst others. Books on global warming and articles from IETA, PCF 
( Prototype Carbon Fund) CDM field guides, World Bank articles etc, will also be used. Many 
articles from climate research consultants are available on the World Wide Web, as well as being 
published. 
 
3. How will informed consent be obtained? 
 
 
By direct request - personal and in writing. 
 
3.1 Please attach participants’ information sheet, informed consent form and questionnaire or 
interview format if any 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
4. Who will the participants be? 
 
Key stakeholders and project developers of CDM projects. 
 
 
4.1 State the age ranges of the participants 
 
 
25-60 yrs 
 
4.2 How will the participants be selected and exactly what will they be told when asked to 
participate in the research? 
 
The DME (Dept of Mineral Affairs and Energy) have supplied me with a list of project developers, 
and I have received other names from energy consultants. These are all key players in the CDM 
market. 
 
4.3 Are the participants considered to be vulnerable individuals (including pregnant women, 
orphans, etc)? 
 
No 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
5. Will the research be of any direct benefit to the participants? 
 
 YES / NO (delete whichever is not applicable) 
 
 If ‘YES’ elaborate briefly. 
 
The intention is to improve the body of knowledge in order to mitigate these issues/constraints that 
key stakeholders may be having, and share best practices/ benefits in order to develop the market 
further. 
 
 
 144 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
6. Are there any risks involved for the participants? (For example – legal, psychological, 
financial or physical risks) If “yes”, please identify them and explain how they will be 
minimized. 
 
 
There are no physical risks, but since the information obtained is confidential, it will be treated with 
absolute circumspection. Participants are free to withdraw at any time or refuse to answer some 
questions. 
 
 
7. How is confidentiality to be guaranteed? 
The information obtained will be held in the strictest of confidence, but when analyzed, only trends 
and patterns will be published in a thesis. No names or institutions will be published, nor any 
information which could be damaging to individuals, groups or organizations. 
 
 
8. Has permission been obtained from the relevant authorities: e.g. Gauteng Dept of Education? 
(Please attach copy). 
 
A letter of approval of the research being done will be obtained from the DME – Dept of Mineral 
Affairs and Energy, as well as permission from interviewees. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
9. What is to be done with the raw research data after completion of the project? 
 
The data remains with the researcher, but trends and patterns will be made available to participants 
and published in my MSc thesis. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
10. How will the end results be reported, and to whom? 
 
End results, trends and patterns will be made available to participants who request feedback. The 
primary report will be my Msc thesis, published by Wits University 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
  In signing this form, I, the supervisor of this project, undertake to ensure that any 
amendments to this project that are required by the Human Research Ethics Committee are 
made before the project commences. 
 
 
Please print name: 
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